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We study fiscal behaviour and the sovereign yield curve in the U.S. and Germany in the 
period 1981:I-2009:IV. The latent factors, level, slope and curvature, obtained with the 
Kalman  filter,  are  used  in  a  VAR  with  macro  and  fiscal  variables,  controlling  for 
financial stress conditions. In the U.S., fiscal shocks have generated (i) an immediate 
response  of  the  short-end  of  the  yield  curve,  associated  with  the  monetary  policy 
reaction, lasting between 6 and 8 quarters, and (ii) an immediate response of the long-
end of the yield curve, lasting 3 years, with an implied elasticity of about 80% for the 
government debt ratio shock and about 48% for the budget balance shock. In Germany, 
fiscal shocks entail no significant reactions of the latent factors and no response of the 
monetary policy interest rate. In particular, while (i) budget balance shocks created no 
response from the yield curve shape, (ii) surprise increases in the debt ratio caused some 





Keywords: yield curve, fiscal policy, financial markets. 







                                                 
* We are grateful to Ad van Riet for useful comments. The opinions expressed herein are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.  
$ ISEG/TULisbon – Technical University of Lisbon, Department of Economics; UECE – Research Unit 
on Complexity and Economics; R. Miguel Lupi 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal. European Central Bank, 
Directorate  General  Economics,  Kaiserstraße  29,  D-60311  Frankfurt  am  Main,  Germany.  UECE  is 
supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal), financed by ERDF and Portuguese 
funds. Emails: aafonso@iseg.utl.pt, antonio.afonso@ecb.europa.eu. 
#  University  of  Porto,  Faculty  of  Economics,  Cef.up  –  Centre  for  Economics  and  Finance  at  the 
University of Porto; Rua Dr Roberto Frias, s/n 4200 464 Porto Portugal. Cef.up is supported by FCT 
(Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal), financed by ERDF and Portuguese funds. Email: 
mmfmartins@fep.up.pt. Manuel M. F. Martins thanks the Fiscal Policies Division of the ECB for its 






1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................5 
2. Literature overview...................................................................................................6 
3. Methodology...........................................................................................................12 
3.1. The yield curve latent factors............................................................................13 
3.2. Setting up the VAR ..........................................................................................15 
4. Empirical analysis...................................................................................................16 
4.1. Data .................................................................................................................16 
4.2. Fitting the yield curve.......................................................................................17 
4.2.1. U.S............................................................................................................18 
4.2.2. Germany....................................................................................................23 
4.3. VAR analysis ...................................................................................................26 
4.3.1. U.S............................................................................................................26 
4.3.1.1. Impulse response functions.................................................................26 
4.3.1.2. Variance decompositions ....................................................................30 
4.3.1.3. Granger causality................................................................................35 
4.3.2. Germany....................................................................................................36 
4.3.2.1. Impulse response functions.................................................................37 
4.3.2.2. Variance decompositions ....................................................................39 
4.3.2.3. Granger causality................................................................................42 
4.3.3. Sub-sample analysis ..................................................................................44 
5. Conclusion..............................................................................................................45 
References..................................................................................................................47 
Appendix – Data sources.............................................................................................52 
Annex 1 – Hyper-parameters.......................................................................................54 






   3 
Non-technical summary 
In  this  paper,  we  use  the  macro-finance  analytical  framework  of  Diebold, 
Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) and enrich their empirical model of the economy with 
variables  representing  fiscal  policy  as  well  as  variables  related  to  financial  factors, 
meant to control for the financial stress conditions faced by the economy. Our set of 
variables allows both for a reasonable identification of the main policy shocks, and also 
for a study of the economy in the low-yield environment and the ensuing financial and 
economic crisis of 2008-2009. 
More specifically, the paper empirically studies the dynamic relation between fiscal 
developments – government debt and the budget deficit – and the shape of the sovereign 
yield curves for the U.S. and for Germany. The shape of the yield curve is measured by 
maximum-likelihood  estimates  of  the  level,  slope  and  curvature,  obtained  with  the 
Kalman filter, following the state-space specification of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) 
model.  
The yield curve latent factors and the fiscal variables are related in country-specific 
VAR models that further comprise the variables typically considered in macro-finance 
models – real output, inflation and the  monetary policy  interest rate – as well  as  a 
variable meant to control for the financial conditions. We contribute to the literature by 
specifying and estimating VAR models that are not ex-ante restricted in their lag length 
and which account for the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on the whole shape of the 
curve, rather than estimating the elasticity of a specific interest rate at a specific time-
horizon as is more often the case in analyses of the relation between fiscal behaviour 
and sovereign yields. 
The samples  begin  in the early  1980s and end  in the  last quarter of 2009, thus 
including at least two recessions (1992-93, 2001), the recent economic and financial 
crisis (2008-09), the Volcker chairmanship of the FED (1979-1987) in the U.S., and for 
the case of Germany, the reunification, the approval of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), 
and the creation of the euro (1999). 
In the U.S., fiscal shocks have led to an immediate response of the short-end of the 
yield curve that is apparently associated with the reaction of monetary policy to the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal developments. Such reaction lasts a year and a half (for 
debt ratio shocks) and two years (for budget balance shocks). Fiscal shocks further led 
to  an  immediate  response  of  the  long-end  segment  of  the  yield  curve  –  with  fiscal 
expansions leading to an increase in long-term sovereign yields – that lasts three years. 
At the height of the effects, our estimates imply an elasticity of long-term yields to a 
debt ratio shock of about 0.80 (10
th-11
th quarters after the shock) and an elasticity to a 
budget balance shock of about 0.48 (12 quarters after the shock). Our results differ from 
the findings of papers that found a smaller elasticity of long yields to the debt ratio than   4 
to the budget balance, although such studies do not consider the full yield curve latent 
factors as we do. 
Moreover, shocks to the change in the debt ratio (comparable to a shock in the 
budget balance) account for most of the variance of the errors in forecasting the level of 
the yield curve at horizons above 1 year and explain 40% of such variance at a 12 
quarter horizon. Such shocks also account for substantial, albeit smaller, fractions of the 
variance  of  the  error  in  forecasting  the  slope  and  the  curvature  of  the  yield  curve. 
Shocks to the budget balance ratio are also relevant in accounting for the variance of the 
errors of the yield curve factors. Highlighting the importance of studying fiscal shocks 
we  could  not  reject  the  hypotheses  that  the  change  in  the  debt  ratio  causes,  in  the 
Granger sense, the shape of the yield curve. As regards the budget balance, Granger 
causality has only been found for the slope and the curvature. 
The results for Germany differ markedly from those obtained for the U.S. On the 
one hand, fiscal shocks entail no comparable reactions of the yield curve factors. On the 
other hand, they generate no significant response of the monetary policy interest rate. 
The results also differ across the two alternative fiscal variables. Shocks to the budget 
balance ratio create no response from any component of the yield curve shape, while a 
surprise increase in the change of the debt ratio causes a decline in the concavity of the 
yield curve that implies an increase in both the short-end and the long-end of the yield 
curve; yet, such reaction is very quick and transitory, as it is statistically significant only 
during the 2
nd and 3
rd quarters after the shock. This can be seen as a response of capital 
markets to growing sovereign indebtedness also in the case of Germany. Such result 
seems due to the period before 1999, since, as  the exploratory  sub-sample analyses 
suggest, for both types of fiscal shocks, the impact of fiscal behaviour on the yield curve 
was mitigated after 1999. During 1981-1998, expansionary fiscal shocks have led to 
increases in the yields of the shortest and the longest maturities during the subsequent 
three quarters.    
In  Germany,  fiscal  shocks  have  been  overall  unimportant  in  accounting  for  the 
variance of the errors in forecasting the yield curve latent factors, with two exceptions. 
First, the debt ratio shocks explain a not negligible part of the errors in forecasting the 
curvature – consistently with the  impulse response analysis; second, budget balance 
shocks are somewhat relevant in accounting for errors in forecasting the level of the 
yield curve. In the case of Germany, the results from Granger causality tests agree with 
the impulse responses and forecast errors variance decompositions, as it is not possible 
to reject the hypothesis that either the debt ratio or the budget balance Granger-cause 
any of the yield curve factors.     5 
1. Introduction 
A relevant question, notably for policy makers, is to understand, as far as possible, 
what are the relations between fiscal developments and the shape of the sovereign yield 
curve, as well as the dynamic patterns of such relation. One can expect to observe both a 
bi-directional relationship and similarities across the main developed countries.  
In the related literature there are a number of papers trying to uncover the relation of 
the main fiscal variables with the long-term end of the yield curve in specific time-
horizons, and a few studies assess such relation at some additional points of the curve, 
namely  its  short-term  end.  Nevertheless,  an  attempt  at  thoroughly  uncovering  the 
dynamic relations between fiscal policy developments and the whole shape of the yield 
curve seems to be lacking. It is well known from the finance literature that this shape 
may be parsimoniously represented by estimates of the level, slope and curvature of the 
yield curve. Such an approach to the yield curve characterisation has been followed by a 
recent macro-finance literature mainly focused on non-fiscal macro variables, namely 
real output, inflation and the monetary policy rate.  
In  this  paper,  we  use  the  macro-finance  analytical  framework  and  enrich  the 
empirical model of the economy with variables representing fiscal policy as well as 
additional variables related to financial factors, meant to control for the financial stress 
conditions faced by the economy. Our set of variables allows both for a reasonable 
identification of the main policy shocks, and also for a study of the economy in the low-
yield environment and the ensuing financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. 
More specifically, the paper empirically studies the dynamic relation between fiscal 
developments – government debt and the budget deficit – and the shape of the sovereign 
yield curves for the U.S. and for Germany. The shape of the yield curve is measured by 
estimates of the level, slope and curvature in the Nelson and Siegel (1987) tradition, 
following  the  state-space  specification  and  maximum-likelihood  estimation  with  the 
Kalman filter suggested by Diebold and Li (2006) and Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba 
(2006).  
The yield curve latent factors and the fiscal variables are related in country-specific 
VAR macro-finance models that further comprise the variables typically considered in 
macro-finance models – real output, inflation and the monetary policy interest rate – as 
well as a variable meant to control for the financial conditions. The evidence is based on 
impulse response function analysis, forecast error variance decomposition and Granger 
causality tests. In this context, the novelty of our paper consists of the inclusion of fiscal   6 
variables and a control for financial conditions in an empirical model akin to the one of 
Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006). We contribute to the literature by specifying 
and estimating VAR models that are not ex-ante restricted in their lag length and which 
account for the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on the whole shape of the curve, rather 
than estimating the elasticity of a specific interest rate at a specific time-horizon as is 
more often the case in analyses of the relation between fiscal behaviour and sovereign 
yields. 
The samples  begin  in the early  1980s and end  in the  last quarter of 2009, thus 
including at least two recessions (1992-93, 2001), the recent economic and financial 
crisis (2008-09), the Volcker chairmanship of the FED (1979-1987) in the U.S., and for 
the case of Germany, the reunification, the approval of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), 
and the creation of the euro (1999).  
Changes in policy regimes can be an issue for empirical work as they carry along 
the possibility of structural breaks in the VAR. We check whether the issue is relevant 
in the case of Germany, at the onset of the Economic and Monetary Union, however, 
not enough data area available for the pre-reunification period to check for a possible 
break due to the reunification.  
As regards the US, changes in the fiscal regime are less clear than in the monetary 
policy regime. Nevertheless, almost all  sample  period corresponds to the Greenspan 
chairmanship of the FED and there is not enough data to test for a significant break 
during the Volker chairmanship. We have checked whether starting the sample at 1986 
rather than in 1981changed qualitatively the results and found that it does not. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two gives an overview of the literature. 
Section three explains the methodology to obtain the yield curve latent factors and the 
VAR specifications. Section four conducts the empirical analysis reporting the estimates 
of  the  level,  slope  and  curvature,  as  well  as  the  VAR  results.  Finally,  section  five 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature overview 
Figure 1 shows the strands of literature that connect with this paper, distinguishing 
between nuclear and related literature. On the one hand, our study relates more closely 
with  the  analyses  that  describe  the  shape  of  the  yield  curve  estimating  three  latent 
factors – level, slope and curvature – and then use these variables in VAR-based macro-
finance models of the economy. On the other hand, the paper adds to the large literature   7 
that has estimated the sensitivity of interest rates to fiscal policy, as well as to the recent 
studies of the convergence/divergence of sovereign yields in Europe and in the U.S.  
The extensive literature on the relation between fiscal policy and interest rates has 
largely focused on long-term interest rates, under the rationale that changes in budget 
deficits and/or in government debt cause an adjustment in expected future short-term 
rates and, if the expectations hypothesis holds, an immediate change in long-term rates 
(following  the  consensus  that  long-term  sovereign  yields  are  mostly  determined  by 
expectations of inflation, (trend) growth and the budget deficit and government debt - 
see  e.g.  Canzoneri,  Cumby  and  Diba,  2002).  While  there  are  multiple  theoretical 
channels  motivating  such  rationale  (an  issue  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper),  the 
empirical  evidence  remains  somewhat  mixed  (see  e.g.  the  surveys  by  Barth,  Iden, 
Russek and Wohar, 1991; Gale and Orzag, 2003; European Commission, 2004; and 
Terzi, 2007).  
 
Figure 1 - Relation of this paper with the literature 
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   8 
Overall, the literature warrants the following main conclusions. First, there seems to 
be a significant impact of budget deficits and government debt on long-term interest 
rates, especially detected in studies that use budget deficits and debt projections, rather 
than current fiscal data (see e.g. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2002; Gale and Orzag, 
2004;  Laubach,  2009;  Afonso,  2009;  Hauner  and  Kumar,  2009).  For  instance, 
Schuknecht, von Hagen and  Wolswijk (2010) report that the  interest rate effects of 
budget  deficits  and  government  debt  were  significantly  higher  after  the  Lehmann 
default.  
Second, the sensitivity of interest rates to fiscal variables seems to be smaller in 
Europe than  in the US (see  e.g. Codogno, Favero and Missale, 2003; Bernoth, von 
Hagen and Schuknecht, 2006; Faini, 2006; Paesani, Strauch and Kremer, 2006; and, for 
event studies, Afonso and Strauch, 2007; and Ardagna, 2009). Third, the relation differs 
across different initial levels of government debt ratios (see e.g. Faini, 2006; Ardagna, 
2009;  Ardagna,  Caselli  and  Lane,  2007).  Fourth,  the  elasticity  of  interest  rates  to 
government  debt  seems  to  be  significantly  smaller  than  the  elasticity  to the  budget 
deficit (see e.g. Laubach, 2009; Engen and Hubbard, 2004; Kinoshita, 2006; Chalk and 
Tanzi, 2002). 
A  recent  subset  of  this  literature  has  studied  the  convergence  (divergence)  of 
government  bond  yields  in  Europe,  especially  among  the  Euro  Area  countries’, 
following the creation of the EMU and/or the recent financial crisis, with a large part of 
the papers attributing a possible role to fiscal factors in such convergence (divergence). 
These  studies  have  also  typically  looked  at  long-term  yields,  especially  10-year 
government bonds (see e.g. Attinasi, Checherita and Nickel, 2009; Haugh, Ollivaud and 
Turner, 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Barrios, Iversen, 
Lewandowska and Setzer, 2009, and Afonso and Rault, 2010), even when focusing on 
the relevance of fiscal events (see e.g. Codogno, Favero, and Missale, 2003; and Afonso 
and  Strauch,  2007).  In  some  cases,  the  empirical  analysis  has  combined  data  from 
sovereign  debt  issued  at  several  maturities  (Schuknecht,  von  Hagen  and  Wolswijk, 
2010). Yet another part of this research has focused on the determinants – including the 
fiscal ones – of the long-term yield spreads between new European Union countries and 
other European states and benchmarks such as the US or the German bonds (see e.g. 
Nickel, Rother and Rülke, 2009; Alexopolou, Bunda and Ferrando, 2009). 
While  most  of  the  literature  relating  fiscal  developments  with  interest  rates  has 
looked at the long end part of the yield curve, some papers did analyse other segments   9 
of  the  curve.  An  early  example  is  Elmendorf  and  Reifschneider  (2002),  who  have 
compared the effect of several fiscal policy actions on the 10-year treasury yield and the 
monetary policy rate (Fed Funds rate), in order to disentangle the financial feed-backs 
from fiscal policy. Another example is Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), who have 
studied the effect of projections of cumulative budget deficits on the spread between 5-
year (or 10-year) and 3-month Treasury yields. More recently, Geyer, Kossmeier and 
Pichler (2004) considered the spreads, relative to the German Bunds, of the yields of 
two and nine years government bonds of Austria, Belgium, Italy and Spain, which they 
related to a number of macro, fiscal and financial variables.  
In  addition,  Ehrmann,  Fratzscher,  Gurkaynak  and  Swanson  (forthcoming),  used 
daily yields of maturities between two and ten years to study the convergence of the 
shape of the yield curves of Italy and Spain with those of France and Germany after the 
EMU, looking at the first (level) and second (slope) principal components of the yield 
curve. However, they have not considered the very short-end maturities and did not 
explicitly relate the behaviour of the yield curves to fiscal variables. 
Given our purpose of studying the dynamic relation between fiscal policy and the 
shape of the sovereign yield curves, another nuclear strand of literature has developed 
theoretical and empirical macro-finance models that explicitly consider the contour of 
the  whole  yield  curve  and  model  their  dynamic  interactions  with  macroeconomic 
variables.  An  important part of  such  literature has drawn on the Nelson and Siegel 
(1987) decomposition of the yield curve into three latent factors that together allow for a 
description of the yield curve shape at each moment.  
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) and Diebold and Li (2006) have interpreted the 
above mentioned latent factors as Level, Slope and Curvature, and the latter suggested a 
two-step procedure to estimate the factors recursively and iteratively. First, estimating 
the three factors by non-linear-least squares (conditional on some a-priori regarding the 
loadings of the slope and curvature at each maturity); second, using the estimates of the 
factors for forecasting the yield curve. Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) argued 
that such two-steps procedure is sub-optimal and suggested a one-step procedure based 
on  a  state-space  representation  of  the  Nelson-Siegel  model  and  its  estimation  by 
maximum likelihood with the Kalman filter, which allows for estimating all the hyper-
parameters along with the time-varying parameters, i.e. the curve latent factors.  
So  far,  most  of  the  analyses  within  this  approach  have  focused  on  the  relation 
between the yield-curve latent factors and monetary policy, inflation and real activity   10 
(see  for  example  Diebold,  Rudebusch  and  Aruoba,  2006;  Carriero,  Favero  and 
Kaminska,  2006;  Dewachter  and  Lyrio,  2006;  Hordahl,  Tristani  and  Vestin,  2006; 
Rudebusch  and  Wu,  2008;  Hoffmaister,  Roldós  and  Tuladhar,  2010).  This  may  be 
explained by the fact that such approach relates closely with the vast literature on the 
power of the yield curve Slope (and possibly the Curvature) to predict fluctuations in 
real economic activity and inflation – with the transmission mechanism largely seen as 
involving  monetary  policy  –  as  well  as  on  the  relation  of  the  Level  with  inflation 
expectations (see, for example, Ang, Piazzesi and Wei, 2006; Rudebusch and Williams, 
2008 and the references therein).  
While several studies such as Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) and Carriero, 
Favero and Kaminska (2006) have used the Nelson-Siegel decomposition of the yield 
curve, a sub-class of the macro-finance literature has used affine arbitrage-free models 
of the yield curve. These models essentially enhance the Nelson-Siegel parsimonious 
approach  with  no-arbitrage  restrictions  (see  e.g.  Ang  and  Piazzesi,  2003;  Diebold, 
Piazzesi  and  Rudebusch,  2005;  Christensen,  Diebold  and  Rudebusch,  2009;  
Rudebusch,  2010,  and  the  references  therein).  In  this  paper,  we  follow  the  Nelson-
Siegel method to decompose the yield curve into latent factors, and focus on enhancing 
the empirical macro-finance model with fiscal policy variables. 
Macro-finance analyses assessing the role of fiscal variables in the behaviour of the 
whole yield curve do not abound, but there are some papers in that vein, which thus 
relate closely to our paper. An early example is Dai and Philippon (2006), who have 
developed an empirical macro-finance model for the U.S. including, in the macro block, 
the  monetary policy  interest rate,  inflation, real  activity  and the government  budget 
deficit. Their model combines a no-arbitrage affine yield curve comprising a fairly large 
spectrum of maturities, with a set of structural restrictions that allow for identifying 
fiscal policy shocks and their effects on the prices of bonds of different maturities. The 
estimation of their over-identified no-arbitrage structural VAR allows them to conclude 
that government budget deficits affect long-term interest rates, albeit temporarily (with 
high long rates not necessarily turning into high future short-term rates). They estimate 
that a one percentage point increase in the deficit ratio increases the 10-year rate by 35 
basis points after three years, with fiscal policy shocks accounting for up to 13 percent 
of the variance of forecast errors in bond yields. While focusing only on the US case 
and  using  rather  intricate  identifying  restrictions,  their  result  that  fiscal  shocks 
temporarily  increase  the  yield  curve  slope  merits  attention,  namely  when  assessing   11 
whether such result holds for Germany and whether it holds after controlling for the 
financial factors that have been important in the recent crisis.  
Another example is Bikbov and Chernov (2006), who have set-up a no-arbitrage 
affine macro-finance model of the yield curve, inflation, real activity and two latent 
factors. By means of a projection of the latent factors onto the macro variables, they 
extract  the  additional  information  therein  and  interpret  the  projection  residuals  as 
monetary and fiscal shocks, in view of their correlation with a measure of liquidity and 
a measure of government debt growth. They find that real activity and inflation explain 
almost  all  (80  percent)  of  the  variation  in  the  short-term  interest  rate,  while  the 
exogenous monetary and fiscal shocks have a prominent impact on the short and long 
end  of  the  yield  curve,  respectively.  Moreover,  they  find  that  jointly,  they  are  as 
important as inflation and real activity in explaining the long part of the term structure 
and explain 50 percent of the slope variation. In particular, the slope is highly correlated 
with the growth in public debt, a result that they  find consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence concerning the Clinton restrictive budget package on February 1993 as well as 
with the November 1999 increase in taxes, during which the yield curve slope decreased 
between 1.5 and 2 percentage points, due to the fall in long-term yields and no change 
in the short-term yields. 
Finally, a paper that is closer to ours – as it uses the Nelson-Siegel decomposition of 
the yield curve, rather than a no-arbitrage model, and focuses on the effects of fiscal 
policy on the yield curve – is Favero and Giglio (2006). They studied the effects of 
fiscal  policy  on  the  spreads  between  the  Italian  government  bond  yields  and  the 
Germany yields, under a pre and a post-EMU regime of expectations about fiscal policy 
and looking at the whole yield curve rather than a range of maturities. Using quarterly 
data for 1991:II-2006:I, they estimated the yield curve Level, Slope and Curvature and 
then studied the relation between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the Level – interpreted as 
the  long-run component of the curve – as well as the Curvature – the  medium-run 
component – in a framework of Markov-switching regimes of expectations about fiscal 
policy. Their estimates capture the change, with the EMU, from a higher public finances 
expected risk to a lower risk expectations regime, with the estimated impact of the fiscal 
variables on the yield curve depending on the expectations regime. Under unfavourable 
fiscal expectations, they estimate that for every 10 percentage points of increase in the 
Italian debt-to-GDP ratio the  yield curve  level tends to increase  by 0.43 percentage   12 
points;  and that such  increase  in the debt-to-GDP ratio would  imply on average an 
increase of 0.25 percentage points in the medium-term part of the yield curve. 
 
3. Methodology 
We  contribute  to  the  macro-finance  literature  at  an  applied  level  studying  the 
relation  between  the  shape  of  the  sovereign  yield  curve  and  fiscal  behaviour  in  a 
framework  that  is  a  development  of  the  Rudebusch,  Diebold  and  Aruoba’s  (2006) 
approach.  In  addition  to  including  a  fiscal  variable  and  a  control  for  financial 
conditions,  we  estimate  the  VAR  subsequently  to the  estimation  of  the  yield  curve 
factors (in the spirit of Diebold and Li, 2006), which avoids restricting its lag length. 
Our choice of the sample period and control variables allows us to take into account the 
impact of the creation of the euro area, the recent global low-yield period and the 2008-
2009  financial  crisis,  as  well  as  potential  regime  shifts  such  as  the  Volcker 
chairmanship of the  FED (1979-1987) in the U.S., and  in the case of Germany the 
reunification, the approval of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and the creation of the euro 
(1999). 
Regarding the computation of the  yield curve three  main  latent  factors – Level, 
Slope  and  Curvature  –  we  follow  the  parsimonious  Nelson-Siegel  approach  to  the 
modelling  of  the  yield  curve  used  by  e.g.  Diebold  and  Li  (2006)  and  Diebold, 
Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006). Our choice for not following an arbitrage-free approach 
is  motivated  by  the  arguments  set  out  by  Diebold  and  Li  (2006,  pp.  361-362)  and 
Diebold,  Rudebusch  and  Aruoba  (2006,  pp.  333),  stating  that  it  is  not  clear  that 
arbitrage-free  models  are  necessary  or  even  desirable  for  macro-finance  exercises. 
Indeed, if the data abides by the no-arbitrage assumption, then the parsimonious but 
flexible Nelson-Siegel curve should at least approximately capture it, and, if this is not 
the case, then imposing it would depress the model’s ability to forecast the yield curve 
and the macro variables.  
Our  methodological  framework  consists  of  two  steps,  run  separately  for  each 
country. In a first step, the three yield curve latent factors are estimated by maximum 
likelihood using the Kalman filter, as in Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006). In the 
second step, we estimate country-specific VARs with the latent yield curve factors, the 
traditional macroeconomic variables – output, inflation and the overnight interest rate – 
a financial control variable – a financial stress index (FSI) – and a fiscal variable – the 
budget balance ratio or the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, the analyses of the   13 
VAR dynamics, in particular of innovations to the fiscal variable, allow us to address 
the question that motivates the paper.  
 
3.1. The yield curve latent factors 
We model the yield curve using a variation of the three-component exponential 
approximation to the cross-section of yields at any moment in time proposed by Nelson 
and Siegel (1987),  
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where ( ) y  denotes the set of (zero-coupon) yields and   is the corresponding maturity. 
Following Diebold and Li (2006) and Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006), the 
Nelson-Siegel representation is interpreted as a dynamic latent factor model where 1  , 
2    and  3    are  time-varying  parameters  that  capture  the  level  (L),  slope  (S)  and 
curvature (C) of the  yield curve at each period t, while the terms that  multiply the 
factors are the respective factor loadings: 
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.  (2) 
Clearly,  t L  may be interpreted as the overall level of the yield curve, as its loading 
is equal for all maturities. The factor  t S  has a maximum loading (equal to 1) at the 
shortest maturity which then monotonically decays through zero as maturities increase, 
while the factor  t C  has a loading that is null at the shortest maturity, increases until an 
intermediate maturity and then falls back to zero as maturities increase. Hence,  t S   and  
t C  may be interpreted as the short-end and medium-term latent components of the yield 
curve, with the coefficient    ruling the rate of decay of the loading of the short-term 
factor and the maturity where the medium-term one has maximum loading.
1 
As in Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) we assume that  t L ,  t S  and  t C  follow 
a vector autoregressive process of first order, which allows for casting the yield curve 
latent  factor  model  in  state-space  form  and  then  using  the  Kalman  filter  to  obtain 
                                                 
1 Diebold and Li (2006) assume =0.0609, which corresponds to a maximum of the curvature at 29 
months, while Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) estimate =0.077 for the US in the period 1970-
2001, with Fama-Bliss zero-coupon yields, which corresponds to a maximum curvature at 23 months.   14 
maximum-likelihood estimates of the hyper-parameters and the implied estimates of the 
parameters  t L ,  t S  and  t C .  
The state-space form of the model comprises the transition system 
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,  (3) 
where t=1,…..T,  L  ,  S   and  C   are estimates of the mean values of the three latent 
factors, and  ( ) t L  ,  ( ) t S   and  ( ) t C   are innovations to the autoregressive processes of the 
latent factors.  
The measurement system, in turn, relates a set of N observed zero-coupon yields of 
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,  (4) 
where t=1,…,T, and  1 ( ) t   ,  2 ( ) t   ,…, ( ) N t    are measurement errors, i.e. deviations of 
the observed yields at each period t and for each maturity  from the implied yields 
defined by the shape of the fitted yield curve. In matrix notation, the state-space form of 
the model may be written, using the transition and measurement matrices A and  as 
      1 t t t f A f         ,  (5) 
  t t t y f     .  (6) 
For the Kalman filter to be the optimal linear filter, it is assumed that the initial 
conditions set for the state vector are uncorrelated with the innovations of both systems: 
' ( ) 0 t t E f   and 
' ( ) 0 t t E f   . 
Furthermore, following Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) it is assumed that 
the innovations of the measurement and of the transition systems are white noise and 
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 ,  (7) 
and that while the matrix of variance-covariance of the innovations to the transition 
system Q is non-diagonal, the matrix of variance-covariance of the innovations to the 
measurement system H is diagonal – which implies the assumption, rather standard in 
the  finance  literature,  that  the  deviations  of  the  zero-coupon  bond  yields  at  each 
frequency from the fitted yield curve are not correlated with the deviations of the yields 
of other maturities.  
Given a set of adequate starting values for the parameters (the three latent factors) 
and for the hyper-parameters (the coefficients that define the statistical properties of the 
model, such as, e.g., the variances of the innovations), the Kalman filter may be run 
from t=2 through t=T and the one-step-ahead prediction errors and the variance of the 
prediction errors may be used to compute the log-likelihood function. The function is 
then  iterated  on  the  hyper-parameters  with  standard  numerical  methods  and  at  its 
maximum  yields the  maximum-likelihood estimates of the hyper-parameters and the 
implied estimates of the time-series of the time-varying parameters  t L ,  t S  and  t C . 
These latent factors are then recomputed with the Kalman smoother, which uses the 
whole dataset information to estimate them at each period from t=T through t=2 (see 
Harvey, 1989, for details on the Kalman filter and the fixed-interval Kalman smoother). 
 
3.2. Setting up the VAR  
We estimate a VAR model for the above-mentioned set of countries. The variables 
in the VAR are: inflation (), GDP growth (Y), the fiscal variable (f), which can be 
either the government debt or the budget deficit, the monetary policy interest rate (i), an 
indicator for financial market conditions (fsi), and the three yield curve latent factors, 
level (L), slope (S), and curvature (C).  








    X c VX ε ,  (8) 
where  Xt  denotes  the(8 1)    vector  of  the  m  endogenous  variables  given 
by  
'           t t t t t t t t t Y f i fsi L S C   X , c is a (8 1)  vector of intercept terms, V is the 
matrix  of  autoregressive  coefficients  of  order  (8 8)  ,  and  the  vector  of  random   16 
disturbances t ε . The lag length of the endogenous variables, p, will be determined by the 
usual information criteria. 
The VAR is ordered from the most exogenous variable to the least exogenous one, 
and we identify the various shocks in the system relying on the simple contemporary 
recursive  restrictions  given  by  the  Choleski  triangular  factorization  of  the  variance-
covariance matrix. As it seems reasonable to assume that the financial variables may be 
affected instantaneously by shocks to the macroeconomic and fiscal variables but don’t 
affect them contemporaneously, we place the financial stress indicator and the yield 
curve latent factors in the four last positions in the system. In the position immediately 
before the financial variables we place the monetary policy interest rate, which may 
react contemporaneously to shocks to inflation, output and the fiscal variable but won’t 
be able to impact contemporaneously any of those variables, due to the well-known 
monetary policy lags. Finally, we assume that macroeconomic shocks (to inflation and 
output)  may  impact  instantaneously  on  the  fiscal  policy  variable  –  because  of  the 
automatic stabilizers – but that fiscal shocks don’t have any immediate macroeconomic 
effect – again due to policy lags – and thus place the fiscal policy variable in the third 
position in the system.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data 
We develop our VAR analyses for the U.S. and for Germany using quarterly data 
for the period 1981:1-2009:4. The quarterly frequency is imposed by the availability of 
real GDP and fiscal data; the time span is limited by the availability of the indicator of 
financial stress but is also meant to avoid marked structural breaks.  
Given that zero coupon rates can be collected or computed for a longer time span 
and are available at a monthly frequency, the computation of the latent factors of the 
yield curves used data for 1969:1-2010:2 and 1972:9-2010:3 respectively for the U.S. 
and for Germany (all data sources are described in the Appendix). We then computed 
quarterly averages for the time-varying estimates of the yield curves latent factors and 
taken the estimates since 1981:I for the VAR analyses. 
To compute the three yield curve factors (Level, Slope, Curvature) we used zero-
coupon yields for the 17 maturities in Diebold-Rudebusch-Aruoba (2006). The shortest 
maturity is three months and the longest 120 months.   17 
We use the  following  macroeconomic  variables: real GDP growth, inflation rate 
(GDP deflator) and the market interest rate closest to the monetary policy interest rate 
(namely the Fed Funds Rate, for the US, and the money market overnight interest rate 
published by the Bundesbank, for Germany). 
To control for the overall financial conditions we use the March 2010 update of the 
financial stress index suggested by Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag and Tytell (2009). 
The FSI indicator is computed in order to give a composite overview of the overall 
financial  conditions  faced  by  each  individual  country  considering  seven  financial 
variables (further detailed in the Appendix). 
Finally, in order to integrate fiscal developments in the VAR analysis, we use, for 
each country, data for government debt and also for the government budget balance. For 
the case of the U.S. we employ the Federal debt held by the public, as well as Federal 
government and expenditure. For the case of Germany we use central, state and local 
government debt and total general government spending and revenue (see Appendix). 
 
4.2. Fitting the yield curve 
In this section we present some further details on the maximum-likelihood estimation 
of the state-space model described in sub-section 3.1 and the estimation results for each 
country, with an emphasis on the estimated time-series of level, slope and curvature.  
For the whole 17 maturities considered in Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006), 
this  implies that vectors  t y and  t  have 17 rows,   has 17 columns and H  has 17 
columns/rows  (see  equations  (6)  and  (7)).  Moreover,  there  is  a  set  of  19  hyper-
parameters that is independent of the number of available yields and, thus, must be 
estimated for all countries: 9 elements of the (3×3) transition matrix A, 3 elements of the 
(3×1) mean state vector , 1 element () in the measurement matrix   and 6 different 
elements in the (3×3) variance-covariance matrix of the transition system innovations 
Q. In addition to these 19 hyper-parameters, those in the main diagonal of the matrix of 
variance-covariance  of  the  measurement  innovations  H  must  also  be  estimated.  For 
example, in the case of the US, where we have collected data for the 17 benchmark 
maturities, there are 17 additional hyper-parameters – which imply that the numerical 
optimization  involves,  on  the  whole,  the  estimation  of  36  hyper-parameters.  The 
numerical optimization procedures used in this paper follow the standard practices in 
the literature, similar to those reported by Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006).    18 
As regards the latent factors model assumed for the yield curve, it could be argued 
that,  since  the  zero-coupon  data  used  in  this  study  are  overall  generated  with  the 
Svensson (1994) extension to the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model – see e.g. Gurkaynak, 
Sack and Wright (2007), for the US case – the model should include the fourth latent 
factor (and the second coefficient). This coefficient allows the Svensson model to 
capture a second hump in the yield curve at longer maturities than the one captured by 
the Nelson-Siegel  and the curvature factor t C . However, this question turns out to be 
irrelevant in our case, because – following Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) and 
indeed  the  vast  majority  of  the  macro-finance  models  in  the  recent  literature  –  we 
consider yields with maturities only up to 120 months, as the rather small liquidity of 
sovereign bonds of longer maturities precludes a reliable estimation of the respective 
zero-coupon bonds. When present, the second hump that the Svensson extension of the 
Nelson-Siegel is meant to capture occurs at maturities well above 120 months. In fact, 
the  first three principal components of our zero-coupon  yield data explain,  for both 
countries, more than 99 percent of the variation in the data. Moreover, fitting a model 
with four principal components would result in estimating a fourth factor with a loading 
pattern that is quite close to that of the third one. 
 
4.2.1. U.S. 
We now present the estimation results for the model of level, slope and curvature in 
the case of the U.S. As regards hyper-parameters, we restrict the analysis to and the 
implied loadings for the latent factors, reporting estimates and p-values of the remaining 
hyper-parameters  in  the  Annex.  Regarding  parameters,  we  present  and  discuss 
thoroughly the time-series of time-varying estimates of level, slope and curvature (all 
codes, data and results are available from the authors upon request). 
The estimate of  (significant at 1 percent) is 0.03706, which implies a maximum 
of the medium-term latent factor – the curvature,  t C  – at the maturity of 48 months and 
a rather slow decay of the short-term factor – the slope,  t S  – in comparison with the 
patterns implied by the estimate in Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) – 0.077 – 
and the assumption in Diebold and Li (2006) – 0.0609 –, which imply maximums of  t C  
at 23 and 29 months, respectively. Figure 2 shows the loadings of the three latent factors 
implied by our estimate of . The divergence to the referred estimates in the literature is 
due to differences in the sample period and to a difference in the method of computation   19 
of the zero-coupon yields – with respect to this issue, it should be stressed that the 
methods used in computing the zero-coupon yields are consistent across the countries 
considered in this paper. 
 












Note: The figure shows the loading of each latent factor at each maturity, expressed in months. 
 
The estimates of the mean values of the three latent factors are reasonable and fairly 
precise (see Annex 1). The negative mean values estimated for  t S  and  t C  imply the 
typical  shape  of  the  yield  curve  as  an  ascending  and  concave  curve,  as  expected. 
Moreover, all three latent factors follow highly persistent autoregressive processes, but, 
as usual in the literature,  t L  is more persistent than t S  which, in turn, is more persistent 
than t C . Our estimates indicate that the lagged value of the curvature, 1 t C  , significantly 
drives  the  dynamics  of  the  level,  t L   (with  a  decrease  in  the  degree  of  concavity 
associated with an increase in the level) and that the lagged value of the level, 1 t L  , 
significantly  drives  the  dynamics  of  the  slope,  t S   (with  an  increase  in  the  level 
associated with an increase in the slope).    
In addition, the innovations to the curvature,  t C , have a larger variance than those 
to the slope,  t S , which in turn have a higher variance than the innovations to the level, 
t L . Such a result is consistent with the literature and with our a priori ideas. Overall,   20 
these results imply that  t L  is the smoother latent factor,  t S  is less smooth and  t C  is the 
least smooth factor.  
Figure 3 shows the time-series of the three yield curve latent factors,  t L ,  t S  and  t C  
computed with the  Kalman smoother, after convergence of the  maximum-likelihood 
estimation. The pattern of all  factors  is quite  similar to the one seen  in the related 
literature.  The  level  shows  the  gradual  rise  in  all  yields  in  the  build-up  of  the 
inflationary environment of the 1960s-1970s, the peak in the yields associated to the 
1979-1982 inflation reduction (contemporaneous of the Volcker chairmanship of the 
FED), the  gradual  but  steady  fall  in  overall  yields  since  the  beginning  of  the  great 
moderation in 1984 and the recent increase in the yields ahead and after the financial 
crisis (2008-2009). 
 









Note: The figure shows the values of the three latent factors at each month.  
 
The slope shows the typical pattern of ascending yield curves (negative values of t S ) 
except for very brief episodes known to be associated with restrictive monetary policies, 
as well as for the episode of a persistently descending yield curve associated to the 
1979-1982 disinflation. 
The curvature displays, as usual in the literature (and as expected given the hyper-
parameters estimates discussed in the Annex), a much higher variation than the slope 
and the level, with an apparent positive correlation with the slope since the end of the   21 
1980s, which does not seem to have existed in the previous period. After the 1980s, 
larger negative values of  t S , i.e. steeper ascending curves, tend to be associated with 
larger  negative  values of  t C , i.e. less pronounced  concavity or even  convex curves 
(lower negative values of  t S  (flatter curves) tend to be associated to lower negative 
values  of  t C ,  i.e.  more  pronounced  concavities;  and  in  episodes  of  inverted  yield 
curves, positive values of  t S  tend to be associated to less negative or even positive 
values of  t C , i.e. more pronounced concavities).     
As a sensitivity check, in Figure 4 we present our estimates for each of the yield 
curve  latent  factor  together  with  the  corresponding  empirical  measures  directly 
computable  from  the  zero-coupon  yields  that  are  typically  used  in  the  literature  as 
proxies for the latent factors: 
        (3) (24) (120) 3 t t t Level y y y        ,  (9) 
      (3) (120) t t Slope y y       ,  (10) 
        (24) (3) (120) 2 t t t Curvature y y y        ,  (11) 
where  ( ) t m y  refers to the zero-coupon bond yield of maturity m (in months).  
Our estimated time-series  t L  follows quite closely the simple average of the zero-
coupon yields of 3, 24 and 120 months of maturity (with a 86% correlation), except in 
the first half of the 1990s – a result also present in Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba 
(2006) –, in the first half of the 2000s and since the beginning of the financial crisis in 
mid-2007  (periods  not  covered  in  Diebold,  Rudebusch  and  Aruoba,  2006).  Overall, 
t L depicts a smoother pattern, thus appearing to have a superior ability to capture the 
dynamics f the whole yield curve – as a level factor should – than the mere average of 
three out of the 17 considered maturities. 
Our estimates of  t S  have a very high correlation with the standard empirical proxy 
for the yield curve slope (93%), in line with the correlations typically seen in the related 
literature  (see  e.g.  Diebold,  Rudebusch  and  Aruoba,  2006).  The  main  divergence 
between the two time-series are that our estimates display a higher variation since the 
1990s, which generates deeper troughs in 1990-1994, 2001-2004 and at the end of the 
sample period since late 2007. 
   22 






































Note: Each chart compares, for each latent factor, the estimates obtained with maximum likelihood with 
the Kaman filter, as described in the text, with the corresponding empirical proxy.   23 
The estimated time-series for  t C  has a higher variability than its empirical proxy, as 
Figure 4.3 clearly shows. As a result, even though their movements are fairly close to 
each other, their correlation is only of 72%. 
In the recent financial crisis, differently from what the empirical proxy is able to 
capture,  our  estimates  point  to  persistent  and  sizeable  negative  values  of  t C , 
corresponding to a less pronounced concavity of the yield curves, which, as shown in 
Figure 4.3, were steeply upward (as monetary policy rates were decreased abruptly to 
combat  the  crisis).  Another  visible  difference  between  our  t C   estimates  and  their 
empirical counterparts appear in the disinflationary episode, in which  t C  signals a much 
more  pronounced  inversion  of  the  curvature  (to  convexity)  in  association  with  the 
inversion of the slope indicated by both  t S  and its proxy in Figure 4.3.  
Overall, we can conclude that our estimates of the three yield curve latent factors, 
t L ,  t S  and  t C , describe a historical evolution of the yield curve shape that is coherent 
across the factors and consistent with the main known monetary and financial facts. The 
estimates are also in line, with an apparent advantage in some episodes, with the history 
described by their traditional empirical counterparts.   
 
4.2.2. Germany 
In this sub-section we present the estimates of the time-varying parameters – level, 
slope and curvature – for the case of Germany. As regards hyper-parameters, as in the 
U.S. case, we only discuss  in the text and present further details in Annex 1 (all codes, 
data and results are available from the authors upon request). 
The  estimate  of    (which  is  significant  at  1  percent)  is  0.04125,  implying  a 
maximum of loading of the curvature at the maturity of 43 months and a rather slow 
decay of the loading of the slope – a result fairly similar to the one obtained for the U.S. 
Figure 5 shows the estimated time-series of  t L ,  t S  and  t C  (computed with the 
Kalman smoother) for Germany.  t L  shows how Germany’s yields have peaked during 
the first oil shock, given the well-known accommodative macroeconomic policy, but 
also how that peak was less marked and less persistent than the one seen in the U.S. at 
the end of the 1970s, given the smaller disinflation needs. The figure further shows how 
yields rose after the reunification and how they have only fallen for the current standard 
levels in the second half of the 1990s, ahead of the creation of the EMU.   24 
 











Note: The figure shows the values of the three latent factors at each month.  
 
The slope, t S , shows the typical pattern of ascending yield curves except for the 
episodes known to be associated with restrictive monetary policies, as well as for the 
episode of the German reunification (1991). The curvature displays, as usual, a much 
higher variation than the slope and the level. As in the case of the U.S. there is an 
apparent positive correlation between  t S  and  t C  since the second half of the 1980s.     
In Figure 6 we present the estimates for each of the yield curve latent factor together 
with the corresponding empirical measure typically used in the literature as proxy (as in 
the case of the U.S., using also equations (9), (10) and (11)). The correlations between 
the model estimates and the empirical measures are somewhat smaller than for the U.S., 
which  is  due,  mostly,  to  the  very  high  volatility  of  the  zero-coupon  yields  at  the 
beginning of the sample. For the whole sample, the correlations are of 80%, 68% and 
27% respectively for the level, slope and curvature. For a sample beginning in 1980 – 
such as the one that will be used in the VAR analysis (then, after computing simple 
quarterly averages, to match the periodicity of the macro variables) – the correlations 
are of  77%, 94% and 69%, which is more in line with the results for the U.S. case. 
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Note: Each chart compares, for each latent factor, the estimates obtained with maximum likelihood with 
the Kaman filter, as described in the text, with the corresponding empirical proxy.   26 
4.3. VAR analysis 
It could be argued that the estimation of the yield curve latent factors and of the 
macro-fiscal-finance  VAR,  for  the  sake  of  econometric  consistency,  should  be 
performed  simultaneously  in  an  encompassing  state-space  model  (by  maximum-
likelihood with the Kalman filter). In fact, that is the approach undertook by Diebold, 
Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006) in their macro-finance empirical analysis. 
Our choice of separating the state-space modelling and estimation of the yield curve 
latent factors from the estimation and analysis of the macro-fiscal-finance VAR is based 
on two arguments. First, subsuming the estimation of the yield curve factors and of the 
VAR  in  a  unique  state-space  model  implies  that  the  macro-fiscal-finance  VAR  is 
necessarily restricted to be a VAR(1), when there is no guarantee that this would be the 
outcome  of  the  optimal  lag  length  analysis.  In  fact,  on  the  basis  of  the  standard 
information  criteria  and  of  the  analysis  of  the  autocorrelation  and  normality  of  the 
residuals, we estimate a VAR(4) for the U.S. and a VAR(2) for Germany (irrespectively 
of  the  fiscal  variable).  Second,  the  encompassing  state-space  model  would  generate 
estimates of the yield curve factors that would not differ markedly from those obtained 
in the pure finance state-space model described in 3.1, as only yield data are considered 
in  its  measurement  system.  Thus,  using  the  previously  estimated  yield  curve  latent 
factors in a subsequent VAR analysis does not expose our framework to the generated 
regressor criticism put forward by Pagan (1994). 
 
4.3.1. U.S. 
4.3.1.1. Impulse response functions   
In this section we report the impulse response functions (IRFs) of all the variables in 
the system to a positive innovation to the fiscal variable (annual change of the debt-to-
GDP ratio) with magnitude of one standard deviation of the respective errors, together 
with the usual two-standard error (95 percent) confidence bands. Overall, the results 
confirm that the system is stationary and may be summarized as follows (see Figure 7). 
   27 
Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions to shock in annual change of the 
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Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Notes: INF: inflation; DY4: annual growth rate of real GDP; DB4: annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio; FFR: 
federal funds rate; FSI: financial stress indicator; LEVELM, SLOPEM, and CURVM, respectively level, slope and 
curvature latent factors. 
 
The following comments arise from the analysis of the results. First, output growth 
and inflation fall and are significantly below their initial values during about 5 quarters. 
Most probably as a reaction to the deterioration  in real  activity and deceleration of 
prices, the monetary policy interest rate falls for about 5 quarters. Second, the surprise 
increase  in  the  annual  change  of  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  leads  to  an  increase  in  the 
financial  stress  indicator  that  is  significant  for  about  5  quarters.  Third,  the  fiscal 
innovation  does  not  lead  to  a  statistically  significant  response  of  the  yield  curve 
curvature, but to significant, albeit transitory, reactions of its slope and level.  
It is useful to split the dynamic response of the yield curve to the fiscal innovation 
into 3 phases: (i) the 6 initial quarters, (ii) quarters 7 through 12 and, (iii) the subsequent 
quarters.  In  phase  (i)  the  slope  of  the  yield  curve  increases  and  its  level  remains 
unchanged, at standard statistical levels of confidence. Since the latter means that the 
average yields do not change, the reactions of the slope and level combined imply that 
the yields at the shortest maturities fall – in  line with the decrease in the monetary 
policy interest rate – and the long-end yields necessarily increase – also in line with the   28 
deterioration  in  the  overall  financial  conditions  index.  In  phase  (ii)  the  slope  starts 
falling and returns, statistically, to its original value, while the level of the yield curve 
increases to values that are statistically above the initial ones, remaining so until the 12
th 
quarter. Combined, the reactions of the slope and of the level imply that the yields of 
the short-end maturities now increase and that the yields of the long-end of the yield 
curve remain above their original values. The rise in the shortest maturities yields is 
consistent with the response of the monetary policy rate. Finally, from the 12
th quarter 
onwards, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the yield curve has returned to its 
initial shape, i.e. the original slope and level.  
In short, a positive innovation to the rate of change of the debt-to-GDP ratio leads to 
an increase in the yields in the long-end maturities of the curve (which comprises, at the 
extreme, the usual 10 years maturity studied in most fiscal-finance analyses) during 12 
quarters, i.e. 3 years. Indeed, an innovation of 0.47 percentage points in the rate of 
change of the debt ratio is associated with an upward response of the yield curve longest 
maturities yields that amounts to 38 basis points, at its peak, which occurs in the 10
th-
11
th quarters after the innovation (a conclusion that is warranted as the values of slope 
and curvature are essentially similar to their baselines). 
We now move on to the impulse response functions of all the variables in the system 
to a positive innovation to the alternative fiscal variable, the budget balance ratio, with a 
magnitude of one standard deviation of the respective errors, together with the two-
standard error confidence bands (see Figure 8). The results confirm that the system is 
stationary  and  are  qualitatively  identical  to  those  obtained  with  innovations  to  the 
change in the debt-to-GDP ratio (as expected, with the opposite sign). Considering both 
the IRFs and their confidence bands, the results may be summarized as follows. 
First,  output  growth  increases  between  the  2
nd  and  the  5
th  quarter  after  the 
innovation and inflation rises between the 4
th and the 6
th quarter. Most probably as a 
reaction to the improvement in real activity and acceleration of prices, the monetary 
policy interest rate rises between the 2
nd and the 6
th quarter after the innovation. Second, 
the fiscal innovation leads to a statistically significant response of the financial stress 
indicator, with overall financial conditions improving, in the 3 to 4 quarters horizon. 
Third, the positive innovation to the budget balance ratio leads to transitory significant 
responses of the yield curve slope and level, as well as to a significant reaction of the 
curvature that happens, in turn, during a very brief period.  
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Notes: BALANCE – budget balance ratio, INF: inflation; DY4: annual growth rate of real GDP; FFR: federal funds 
rate; FSI: financial stress indicator; LEVELM, SLOPEM, and CURVM, respectively level, slope and curvature latent 
factors. 
 
In  this  case  we  can  also  divide  the  dynamic  response  of  the  yield  curve  to the 
balance-to-GDP ratio innovation into three phases (with the first one including a brief 
sub-phase):  (i)  the  8  initial  quarters, (ii)  quarters  9  through  12,  (iii)  the  subsequent 
quarters. In phase (i) the slope of the yield curve falls and its level remains unchanged 
(notice that a budget balance increase implies an improvement of the fiscal position). 
The latter means that the average yields do not change and the combined reactions of 
the slope and of the level imply that the yields at the shortest maturities increase – in 
line with the increase in the monetary policy interest rate – and the long-end yields 
necessarily fall. During quarters three through seven after the innovation, one can reject, 
at 95 percent of confidence, the hypothesis that the curvature remains unchanged, in 
favour of a reduction in the curvature, further reinforcing the conclusion that yields at 
the long-end of the curve fall. Consistently, during a considerable part of this initial 
phase, the overall financial conditions improve, in reaction to the improvement in the 
fiscal position, even though the short-term interest rate increase. In phase (ii) the level is 
significantly below its initial value and the slope starts increasing, as does the curvature;   30 
it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the slope has returned to its original values. 
These  reactions  of  the  slope  and  of  the  level  mean  that  the  yields  at  the  short-end 
maturities now decrease and that the yields of the long-end of the yield curve remain 
below their original values. Finally, from the 12
th quarter onwards, it is not possible to 
reject the hypothesis that the yield curve has returned to its initial shape, i.e. the original 
slope and level.  
Summarising, a positive innovation to the budget balance (in percentage of GDP) 
leads  to  a  decrease  in  the  yields  of  the  long-end  maturities  of  the  curve  (which 
comprises, at the extreme, the usual 120 months maturity) during 12 quarters, i.e. three 
years. An innovation (improvement) of 0.55 percentage points in the budget balance 
ratio  is  associated  with  a  downward  response  of  the  longest  maturities  yields  that 
amounts to 26 basis points in the 12
th quarter after the innovation (when the slope and 
the curvature have returned to their baseline values and the level component is 26 points 
below its initial value). 
 
4.3.1.2. Variance decompositions   
For the case of the VAR including the change of the debt-to-GDP ratio as the fiscal 
measure, the results may be summarized as follows (see Table 1). At a 4-quarter horizon 
and as expected, most of the variance of the error in forecasting the change in the debt 
ratio (panel 1.1) comes from fiscal innovations. However, outputs surprises and, to a 
lesser extent, interest rate and inflation surprises, also explain some of that forecast error 
variance.  At  the  8-quarter  horizon,  fiscal  innovations  account  for  about  half  of  the 
forecast error variance and innovations to inflation, output and the slope of the yield 
curve attain a sizeable importance. For forecast horizons of 12 quarters and beyond, the 
importance of surprises to the slope of the yield curve stabilizes at around 10 percent, 
which  corresponds  to  a  similar  explanatory  power  of  that  of  output  surprises  (with 
inflation surprises remaining the main driver of the variance of the errors in forecasting 
the growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio in addition to fiscal surprises).    
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Table 1. Annual Change in Debt-to-GDP Ratio Forecast Error Variance 
Decomposition, U.S. 1981:I-2009:IV. 
1.1. Forecasting the Change of the Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Period  INF  DY4  DB4  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
4  3.644  13.426  75.805  2.119  3.834  0.245  0.781  0.142 
8  24.466  9.944  49.373  2.229  4.070  0.097  8.145  1.673 
12  22.251  9.633  43.444  6.011  6.411  0.206  10.131  1.910 
16  22.899  9.222  42.587  5.985  6.706  0.374  10.013  2.209 
20  22.641  8.705  42.060  6.374  8.233  0.442  9.361  2.181 
24  22.793  8.591  39.994  6.354  9.059  0.426  10.410  2.369 
1.2 Forecasting the Level of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4  DB4  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
4  1.527  15.549  0.324  0.983  1.402  73.729  1.059  5.422 
8  4.491  9.898  16.469  6.3169  7.148  48.349  1.924  5.400 
12  7.237  5.190  39.603  5.545  12.355  24.552  2.225  3.288 
16  9.414  4.429  33.697  14.441  11.893  19.571  2.050  4.501 
20  9.631  5.215  28.751  17.693  10.819  16.169  7.954  3.763 
24  10.220  5.280  27.483  17.109  10.668  15.458  9.548  4.231 
1.3. Forecasting the Slope of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4  DB4  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
4  0.421  8.077  12.001  38.997  0.518  12.690  27.132  0.161 
8  3.108  15.146  15.901  24.509  0.472  8.292  30.944  1.626 
12  6.122  13.516  14.651  21.106  1.594  6.938  33.139  2.931 
16  7.140  14.060  16.208  20.375  2.442  6.077  29.783  3.913 
20  8.622  14.624  20.397  17.195  2.059  5.270  27.665  4.164 
24  9.695  14.367  22.463  15.85  1.978  5.069  26.581  3.988 
1.4. Forecasting the Curvature of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4  DB4  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
4  2.959  16.937  5.614  0.521  13.713  3.906  11.182  45.164 
8  4.979  20.379  7.771  0.419  11.369  6.069  13.641  35.370 
12  5.222  19.769  8.659  0.544  10.640  6.797  15.529  32.837 
16  5.693  17.267  15.400  0.510  12.157  5.975  14.371  28.624 
20  7.845  16.014  18.484  1.258  11.065  5.342  13.179  26.810 
24  7.521  15.297  20.295  2.787  10.609  5.214  12.635  25.640 
 
Notes: INF: inflation; DY4: annual growth rate of real GDP; DB4: annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio; FFR: 
federal funds rate; FSI: financial stress indicator; L: level of the yield curve; S: slope of the yield curve; C: curvature 
of the yield curve. Each row shows the percentage of the variance of the error in forecasting the variable mentioned in 
the title of the table, at each forecasting horizon (in quarters) given in the first column. 
 
As panel 1.2 in Table 1 shows, the variance of the errors in forecasting the level of 
the yield curve at a 4-quarter horizon is mostly explained, as expected, by innovations 
to the level itself. Nevertheless, surprises to output growth and, although to a lesser 
extent,  surprises  to  the  curvature  of  the  yield  curve  explain  sizeable  parts  of  such 
variance. From the 8-quarter horizon onwards, innovations to the change in the debt-to-
GDP ratio become the most important explanations for the variance of the errors in 
forecasting  the  yield  curve  level  (from  the  12-quarter  horizon  onwards  even  above 
innovations to the level itself). This contribution peaks at almost 40 percent in the 12 
quarters horizon and is still around 28 percent at the horizon of six years. From the 8
th 
quarter onwards the shocks to the financial stress indicator also account for around 12   32 
percent of the forecast error variance of the level of the yield curve and from the 16-
quarter horizon monetary policy surprises account for more than 15 per cent of the error 
variance. Most importantly, fiscal surprises account for a much larger fraction of the 
forecast error variance of the yield curve level than any individual macroeconomic and 
financial variables. 
Panel 1.3 in Table 1 shows that in a 4-quarter horizon, surprises to the monetary 
policy interest rate explain the major part of the variance of the forecasting errors of the 
yield  curve  slope  –  a  result  that  is  consistent  with  the  monetary  policy  hypothesis 
regarding  the  power  of  the  yield  curve  slope  to  predict  economic  activity.  As  the 
forecast  horizon  widens,  the  part  explained  by  monetary  policy  innovations  falls 
gradually, but remains as large as 15 percent at a 24 quarters horizon. From the 8-
quarter horizon onwards, surprises to the growth rate of real GDP explain a sizeable part 
of the slope forecast error variance, as well as do surprises to inflation, albeit with a 
delay and smaller magnitudes. Innovations to the government debt ratio explain a bit 
less than they do in the case of the forecast error variance of the level, but are still very 
much considerable in the case of the yield curve slope, and increase their contribution 
gradually as the forecast horizon widens, from 15 percent at the 8-quarter horizon to 22 
percent at the 24-quarter horizon.  
Finally, panel 1.4 in Table 1 shows that at a 4-quarter horizon, surprises to the yield 
curve  curvature  itself  explain  the  largest  part  of  the  forecast  error  variance  of  the 
curvature, as expected, but that surprises to real output growth and the financial stress 
index also have important explanatory power, as also have surprises to the yield curve 
slope. While fiscal surprises initially do not explain a considerable part of the curvature 
forecast error variance, their importance increases steadily with the forecast horizon and 
amounts to 15 to 20 percent at horizons above 16 quarters. Innovations to the yield 
curve  slope  have  similar  explanatory  power  as  do  surprises  to the  overall  financial 
conditions index.  
We now move to the decomposition of the forecast errors variance for the balance-
to-GDP  ratio  and  the  yield  curve  latent  factors,  for  the  selected  horizons  above 
considered  for  the  case  of  the  alternative  fiscal  policy  variable.  The  results  can  be 
summarized as follows (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Balance Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, U.S. 1981:I-2009:IV. 
2.1. Forecasting the Budget Balance 
Period  INF  DY4  BALANCE  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
4  2.018  5.984  69.998  0.470  10.578  3.433  7.091  0.429 
8  3.592  7.049  65.332  0.839  7.131  3.116  12.776  0.166 
12   3.327   7.286   60.621   4.909   7.282   2.226   14.238   0.110 
16  3.615  6.950  58.149  7.363  9.061  1.938  12.803  0.121 
20  3.749  6.853  56.329  9.417  9.184  1.898  12.106  0.462 
24  3.777  6.868  55.243  10.289  9.448  1.987  11.600  0.788 
2.2 Forecasting the Level of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4  BALANCE  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
4  1.653  19.183  0.771  1.016  2.027  68.705  1.314  5.330 
8  10.873  12.876  2.946  4.109  15.703  46.076  1.493  5.924 
12  7.506  7.296  17.151  6.293  30.553  25.656  1.263  4.282 
16  6.196  5.694  20.448  17.717  24.903  19.414  1.211  4.417 
20  5.937  4.963  18.873  21.355  24.972  16.662  2.771  4.467 
24  5.998  4.717  21.299  21.124  24.010  14.925  2.810  5.118 
2.3. Forecasting the Slope of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4  BALANCE  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
4  1.548  6.634  15.905  34.293  0.038  15.055  26.373  0.151 
8  1.049  10.52  25.401  18.450  2.383  10.329  28.939  2.921 
12  2.199  9.067  26.615  15.772  2.423  8.501  30.610  4.809 
16  2.410  9.054  26.574  16.592  2.444  8.288  29.658  4.978 
20  2.325  9.219  28.243  15.492  2.522  7.972  29.568  4.656 
24  2.353  9.116  29.462  14.998  3.111  7.581  28.878  4.498 
2.4. Forecasting the Curvature of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4  BALANCE  FFR  FSI  L  S  C 
 4   1.958   13.717   11.621   1.304   17.147   2.221   7.461   44.567 
 8   6.343   15.293   16.442   1.123   14.758   3.529   7.738   34.771 
 12   6.433   15.211   15.986   1.823   15.763   4.171   8.439   32.170 
 16   6.534   13.446   18.113   2.131   20.086   3.733   7.346   28.606 
 20   5.569   11.568   23.562   3.298   21.093   3.309   6.107   25.491 
 24   5.208   10.707   24.948   6.001   19.468   3.127   5.559   24.979 
 
Notes: INF - inflation; DY4 - annual growth rate of real GDP; BALANCE - budget balance in percentage of GDP; 
FFR - federal funds rate; FSI - financial stress indicator; L - level of the yield curve; S - slope of the yield curve; C - 
curvature of the yield curve. Each row shows the percentage of the variance of the error in forecasting the variable 
mentioned in the title of the table, at each forecasting horizon (in quarters) given in the first column. 
 
At a 4-quarter horizon, most of the variance of the error in forecasting the budget 
balance-to-GDP ratio arises naturally from the fiscal innovations (panel 2.1 in Table 2). 
However,  surprises  to  the  financial  stress  indicator,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  output 
surprises,  also  explain  some  of  that  forecast  error  variance.  Most  importantly, 
innovations to the yield curve slope explain around 7 percent of the variance of the error 
in forecasting the balance. At a horizon of eight quarters, fiscal innovations still account 
for about two thirds of the forecast error variance, while innovations to output, financial 
conditions and, with increasing weight, innovations to the slope of the yield curve attain 
a sizeable importance. For forecast horizons of 12 quarters and beyond, surprises to the 
slope  of  the  yield  curve  are  the  larger  explanation  for  the  forecast  error  variance 
(stabilizing at around 12 percent), even though innovations to the interest rate, financial   34 
conditions  and  output  growth  gradually  gain  some  importance  in  explaining  the 
variance of errors in forecasting the balance-to-GDP ratio. 
As can be seem in panel 2.2 of Table 2, the variance of the errors in forecasting the 
level of the  yield curve at a 4-quarter horizon  is  mostly explained, as expected, by 
innovations to the level itself. Although to a lesser extent, surprises to output growth 
and to the curvature of the yield curve also explain sizeable parts of such variance. 
These features are quite similar to those seen in the case of the growth of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. At the 8, 12 and 16 quarters horizons, innovations to the FSI become the 
most important explanations for the variance of the errors in forecasting the yield curve 
level. The explanatory importance of the budget balance ratio increases steadily along 
the  forecast  horizon,  and  while  it  is  still  inferior  to  those  of  output  and  inflation 
surprises at the 8 quarters horizon, it becomes more important at the 12 quarter horizon, 
and almost as relevant an explanation for the errors in forecasting the level of the yield 
curve  at  the  16,  20  and  24  quarters  horizon  as  the  financial  conditions  index.  Its 
explanatory power peaks somewhat later and at a lower proportion than it is the case of 
the government debt ratio (see panel 2.2 in Table 2). Most importantly, after the 16 
quarters horizon, fiscal surprises and the financial stress indicator surprises account for 
a much larger fraction of the forecast error variance of the yield curve level than the 
macroeconomic variables, inflation and output, as well as, broadly, the monetary policy 
interest rate.  
Regarding the variance of the forecasting errors of the yield curve slope, they are 
mainly explained by surprises to the monetary policy interest rate at a 4-quarter horizon 
(see panel 2.3 of Table 2). Yet, surprises in the budget ratio and in the level of the yield 
curve explain a considerable proportion of the forecast error variance. Moreover, as the 
forecast  horizon  widens  to  no  less  than  8  quarters,  surprises  to  the  fiscal  balance 
consistently are the larger explaining factor for the variance of the errors in forecasting 
the yield curve slope, besides surprises to the slope itself, which makes fiscal policy the 
main explanation for errors in forecasting the slope. In fact, surprises to the monetary 
policy innovations keep on having a considerable role, but their contribution is much 
smaller than in the case of the model with government debt. In turn, surprises to real 
output growth have a similar importance. In comparison to what happens for the model 
with  the  debt  ratio,  in  the  specification  including  the  budget  balance  ratio,  fiscal 
innovations explain much more of the forecast error variance of the slope than of the 
level.   35 
Finally, panel 2.4 of Table 2 reports that at a 4-quarter horizon, surprises to the yield 
curve  curvature  itself  explain  the  largest  part  of  the  forecast  error  variance  of  the 
curvature, as expected, but that surprises to real output growth and the financial stress 
index also have  important explanatory power. In comparison to what is  seen  in the 
system including the growth in the debt-to-GDP ratio, here surprises to the yield curve 
slope have a more limited explanatory power of the variance of the forecast errors of the 
curvature. Budget balance surprises explain a considerable part of the curvature forecast 
error variance, and their importance increases steadily with the forecast horizon and 
amounts to 24 percent at horizons above 20 quarters. At horizons beyond the 4 quarters, 
surprises to the fiscal balance explain overall a larger part of the forecast error variance 
of  the  curvature  than  do  surprises  to  real  output  growth  and  to the  financial  stress 
indicator.  
 
4.3.1.3. Granger causality   
In  this  section  we  present  results  for  Granger  causality  tests  between  the  fiscal 
variables and the yield curve latent factors. We have run the tests for two lag lengths, 
motivated by the analysis of the IRFs above. First, we have included four lags of all 
regressors, which is the lag length considered in the estimation of the VARs and should 
allow for capturing the most immediate inter-relations between fiscal and yield curve 
variables. Then, we have run the tests including 12 lags of all the regressors, the horizon 
after which, according to the IRFs, both the slope and the level of the yield curve return 
to their original values following fiscal innovations. 
Table 3 (panel 3.1) shows that lags of the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio fail to 
statistically decrease the variance of the error in regressions explaining each and all of 
the yield curve factors, either at the 4-quarter and at the 12-quarter horizons. However, 
the results shows that the yield curve slope is a leading indicator of the change in the 
debt-to-GDP  ratio  once  an  horizon  beyond  the  first  4  quarters  is  considered  – 
specifically with a p-value of 3.9 percent within the 12-quarters horizon. In such an 
extended horizon, the slope improves the prediction of the yield curve level, in addition 
to purely autoregressive predictions, with a p-value of 2.8 percent. For both horizons 
considered, the curvature Granger-causes the yield curve level, at standard significance 
levels. 
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Table 3. Granger Causality between the fiscal variables and the Yield Curve latent 
factors, U.S. 1981:I-2009:IV 
3.1. Debt-to-GDP ratio 
  Lags in regressions: 4  Lags in regressions: 12 
  DB4  L  S  C  DB4  L  S  C 
DB4  ---  0.486  0.148  0.882  ---  0.158  0.345  0.696 
L  0.231  ---  0.019**  0.129  0.266  ---  0.063*  0.335 
S  0.151  0.177  ---  0.962  0.039**  0.028**  ---  0.217 
C  0.155  0.014**  0.184  ---  0.673  0.081*  0.676  --- 
3.2. Budget balance 
  Lags in regressions: 4  Lags in regressions: 12 
  BALANCE  L  S  C  BALANCE  L  S  C 
BALANCE  ---  0.650  0.019**  0.031**  ---  0.311  0.199  0.003*** 
L  0.601  ---  0.019**  0.129  0.445  ---  0.063*  0.335 
S  0.153  0.173  ---  0.962  0.486  0.028**  ---  0.217 
C  0.401  0.014**  0.184  ---  0.950  0.081*  0.676  --- 
 
Notes: DB4: annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio; BALANCE - fiscal deficit in percentage of GDP; L - level of 
the yield curve; S - slope of the yield curve; C - curvature of the yield curve. Each entry shows the p-value for the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the variable in each row does not Granger-cause the variable in each column 
(Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.). 
 
We now move to the results for Granger causality tests between the budget balance 
and the yield curve latent factors, again for both 4 and 12 lag lengths (panel 3.2 of Table 
3). The results are somewhat different from those obtained with the debt ratio. For a 
horizon of four lags the budget balance ratio significantly decreases the variance of the 
error in auto-regressions of the yield curve slope (p-value of 0.2 percent) and curvature 
(p-value of 3.1 percent). Such a result holds, in regressions including 12 lags, for the 
case of the curvature, but not of the slope. The results further show that none of the 
yield  curve  latent  factors  Granger-causes  the  budget  balance  ratio,  at  acceptable 
significance levels. Finally, while the slope is a leading indicator of the yield curve 
level, but only when the regressions are extended up to 12 lags (p-value of 2.8 percent), 
the  curvature  is  a  leading  indicator  of  the  yield  curve  slope  irrespectively  of  the 
extension of the regressions (although with a somehow high p-value of 8 percent for the 
12 lag regressions). 
 
4.3.2. Germany 
In this section we describe the results of the VAR analyses for the case of Germany. 
As in the previous sub-section, for the U.S. case, we report results for two VARs, each 
with  an  alternative  measure  of  fiscal  developments  –  the  annual  change  in  the 
government-to-GDP ratio and the  budget balance ratio – sequentially  looking at the 
impulse response functions, variance decomposition and Granger causality.   37 
 
4.3.2.1. Impulse response functions   
Figure 9 depicts the impulse response functions of all the variables in the system to 
a positive innovation to the annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio, together with the 
two-standard error confidence bands. 
 
Figure 9. Impulse Response Functions to shock in annual change of the 
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Response of CURVM to DDEBT4_ADJ
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Notes:  INF:  inflation;  DY4_ADJ:  annual  growth  rate  of  real  GDP  (adjusted  for  the  1991  structural  break); 
DDEBT4_ADJ: annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio (adjusted for the 1991 structural break in GDP); MMR: 
money market interest rate; FSI: financial stress indicator; LEVELM, SLOPEM, and CURVM: level, slope and 
curvature latent factors. 
 
The dynamic reactions are different from those estimated for the U.S. First, there is 
no significant reaction of the macroeconomic variables and the market measure of the 
monetary  policy  interest  rate  consistently  holds  to  its  baseline  value.  Second,  the 
financial stress indicator does not react immediately and decreases significantly in the 
5
th  and  6
th  quarters  after  the  fiscal  shock.  Third,  there  is  no  statistically  significant   38 
response of the yield curve level and slope, and only a very brief fall in the curvature 
during the 2
nd and 3
rd quarters after the fiscal shock.  
In short, the noteworthy impact of a surprise increase in the annual change in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is a fall in the medium-term component of the yield curve within the 
following year, with both a delay and duration of two quarters. Given that the level and 
the slope of the yield curve do not change, the decline in its concavity implies that the 
fiscal shock generates some upward pressures in both the short-end and the long-end of 
the yield curve during that period. 
We report in  Figure 10 the  impulse response  functions (as well as two-standard 
errors confidence bands) of the variables in the system to a positive innovation to the 
budget balance ratio. 
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Response of CURVM to BALANCE
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Notes:  INF:  inflation;  DY4_ADJ:  annual  growth  rate  of  real  GDP  (adjusted  for  the  1991  structural  break); 
BALANCE: budget balance ratio (to GDP adjusted for the 1991 structural break); MMR: money market interest rate; 
FSI: financial stress indicator; LEVELM, SLOPEM, and CURVM: level, slope and curvature latent factors. 
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Again,  the  dynamic  reactions  differ  from  those  estimated  for  the  U.S.  Also  in 
contrast to what has been found for the U.S. case, the IRFs of a budget balance ratio 
shock  differ  somewhat  from  those  of  a  shock  to  the  debt  ratio.  First,  there  is  no 
significant  reaction  of  real  output  and  the  market  measure  of  the  monetary  policy 
interest  rate  consistently  holds  to  its  baseline  value,  but  inflation  significantly  falls 
during the three quarters following the shock. Second, there is no significant reaction of 
the financial stress indicator apart from, to some extent, the upward response at the 4
th 
quarter. Third, there is essentially no statistically significant response of the yield curve 
latent factors, level, slope and curvature, although the level picks up to some extent after 
8 quarters.  
 
4.3.2.2. Variance decompositions   
Table  4  reports,  for  selected  horizons,  the  decomposition  of  the  forecast  errors 
variance of the fiscal policy variable and the yield curve latent factors in the case of the 
VAR including the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio as indicator of fiscal behaviour.  
Panel 4.1 shows that within the two-year forecast horizon most of the variance of 
the  error  in  forecasting  the  change  in  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  comes  from  fiscal 
innovations. These innovations then lose some importance at longer forecast horizons, 
as surprises to output and the overall financial conditions gain importance in accounting 
for the forecast error variance. Innovations to the latent factors describing the shape of 
the  yield  curve  are  relatively  unimportant,  especially  at  the  shorter  horizons;  in 
particular, the slope of the yield curve is less important than in the U.S. case. 
  A relevant result shown in panel 4.2 – which contrasts with the U.S. case – is that 
innovations to the debt-to-GDP ratio are unimportant in explaining the variance of the 
error in forecasting the level of the yield curve, irrespectively of the forecast horizon. 
While, as usual, shocks to the level itself account for most of the variance of the forecast 
errors at short horizons, from the 8-quarter horizon onwards inflation and the curvature 
of the yield curve account for an important part of the variance and, from the 16-quarter 
horizon onwards, real output has also a large role.  
   40 
Table 4. Annual Change in Debt-to-GDP Ratio Forecast Error Variance 
Decomposition, Germany 1981:I-2009:IV. 
4.1. Forecasting the Change of the Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  DB4_ADJ  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
4   3.249   11.239   69.381   2.304   7.7192   3.244   2.334   0.529 
8   2.736   21.276   50.920   2.543   12.630   4.587   3.909   1.398 
12   3.983   20.922   48.450   3.869   12.848   4.379   3.885   1.665 
16   4.678   22.273   45.094   5.420   12.172   4.055   4.436   1.873 
20   4.568   23.037   43.531   5.713   12.163   3.975   4.585   2.428 
24   4.747   23.005   43.101   5.682   12.183   4.0174   4.549   2.717 
4.2. Forecasting the Level of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  DB4_ADJ  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
4   4.052   0.462   0.437   2.549   10.136   77.405   0.2738   4.686 
8   12.862   1.209   0.570   3.780   11.409   58.602   0.825   10.745 
12   11.899   7.102   1.239   6.368   11.672   45.774   0.697   15.250 
16   10.126   12.991   1.353   7.971   12.676   36.486   0.659   17.738 
20   9.714   15.637   1.232   8.323   13.279   31.840   0.613   19.362 
24   9.930   16.531   1.154   8.298   13.565   29.606   0.556   20.359 
4.3. Forecasting the Slope of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  DB4_ADJ  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
4   17.708   16.824   0.479   41.921   0.063   10.701   12.064   0.242 
8   18.551   25.935   0.376   33.387   0.239   7.238   12.992   1.284 
12   17.751   26.874   0.591   32.166   0.488   6.859   13.324   1.947 
16   18.000   26.739   0.647   32.000   0.491   6.839   13.266   2.018 
20   18.031   26.760   0.649   31.949   0.500   6.811   13.284   2.017 
24   18.021   26.763   0.655   31.938   0.501   6.811   13.284   2.027 
4.4. Forecasting the Curvature of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  DB4_ADJ  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
4   0.915   6.614   7.793   2.302   4.949   9.427   1.979   66.022 
8   1.582   8.647   7.211   3.335   6.372   8.434   3.856   60.563 
12   1.554   9.337   6.886   4.229   6.437   8.491   3.955   59.111 
16   1.646   9.824   6.725   4.530   6.499   8.542   3.879   58.356 
20   1.759   10.218   6.621   4.671   6.657   8.519   3.810   57.746 
24   1.876   10.472   6.540   4.728   6.804   8.499   3.756   57.326 
 
Notes: INF: inflation; DY4_ADJ: annual growth rate of real GDP (corrected for structural break in 1991); DB4_ADJ: 
annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio (with GDP adjusted for structural break); MMR: money market interest rate; 
FSI: financial stress indicator; L: level of the yield curve; S: slope of the yield curve; C: curvature of the yield curve. 
Each row shows the percentage of the variance of the error in forecasting the variable mentioned in the title of the 
table, at each forecasting horizon (in quarters) given in the first column. 
 
Similarly to what has just been detected for the level, and again differing from the 
U.S. case, the innovations to the debt-to-GDP ratio are unimportant in explaining the 
variance of the error in forecasting the slope of the yield curve, irrespectively of the 
forecast horizon (see panel 4.3).  Most of such variance is accounted for by surprises to 
the  monetary  policy  interest  rate,  inflation  and  output  growth.  The  very  large 
importance of the money market interest rate implies that the results for Germany seem 
even more consistent with the monetary policy hypothesis for explaining the power of 
the yield curve slope to predict economic activity than in the results for the U.S.  
Panel 4.4 shows that surprises to the yield curve curvature itself explain the largest 
part of the forecast error variance of the curvature, for all forecast horizons. The role of   41 
innovations to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio in accounting for the variance of the 
error  in  forecasting  the  curvature  is  far  larger  than  their  role  in  accounting  for  the 
forecast error of the other two latent factors of the yield curve, but is still rather limited 
as it amounts to less than 8 percent (at the 4-quarter horizon).   
We report in Table 5 the decomposition of the forecast errors variance of the budget 
balance ratio and the yield curve latent factors, for the same selected horizons. 
As panel 5.1 shows, at the 4-quarter horizon most of the variance of the error in 
forecasting the budget balance-to-GDP ratio arises from the fiscal innovations, but from 
the 8-quarter horizon onwards surprises to the financial stress indicator and to output 
explain considerable parts of that forecast error variance. At horizons between 8 and 16 
quarters,  innovations  to  the  level  and  the  slope  of  the  yield  curve  together  explain 
around 13 percent of the variance of the error in forecasting the budget balance, and 
while their importance slightly decreases from the 20-quarters horizon on, the curvature 
gains  importance  and  the  yield  curve  factors  account  for  18  percent  of  the  error 
variance.  
Innovations to the level of the yield curve are the larger explanation for the variance 
of the error in forecasting the level itself, but the financial stress index and the curvature 
of the yield curve are also important explanatory factors (as well as output growth, after 
the 16 quarter-horizon – see panel 5.2). Moreover, innovations to the budget balance 
ratio are moderately important in accounting for the variance of the error in forecasting 
the level of the yield curve, recording a degree of relevance similar to that of inflation 
and  a  bit  higher  than  that  of  the  monetary  policy  interest  rate (until  the  16-quarter 
horizon). 
In  addition,  and  as  panel  5.3  shows,  innovations  to  the  budget  balance  are 
unimportant in accounting for the variance of the forecasting errors of the yield curve 
slope – which contrasts, as happened with the debt ratio, with the results for the U.S. 
Most of that variance is explained by innovations to output growth and by innovations 
to the monetary policy interest rate, as well as, to a smaller but constant extent, by 
surprises to the slope itself and inflation. 
Finally, panel 5.4 shows that innovations to the budget balance ratio are unimportant 
in accounting for the variance of the forecast errors of the yield curve curvature. Such 
findings differ from the U.S. case and, for this particular yield curve latent factor, are 
also in contrast to what has been found in the previous VAR, with the change in the 
debt ratio as fiscal indicator for Germany. Innovations to the yield curve curvature itself   42 
explain, by and large, the bulk of the forecast error variance of the curvature. As regards 
the remaining variables, only surprises to the yield curve level, output growth and, to a 
lesser  extent,  the  financial  stress  index,  accounts  for  non-trivial  parts  of  that  error 
variance.  
  
Table 5. Budget Balance Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, Germany 
1981:I-2009:IV. 
5.1. Forecasting the Budget Balance 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  BALANCE  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
4   2.046   11.696   71.119   1.284   4.906   3.136   5.731   0.082 
8   2.501   18.959   47.488   1.209   15.252   5.554   8.674   0.362 
12   2.807   18.437   44.129   4.325   15.306   5.827   8.258   0.911 
16   2.914   21.343   38.076   7.244   14.145   5.216   8.229   2.833 
20   2.735   23.365   34.359   7.965   14.153   4.976   7.932   4.516 
24   3.181   23.634   32.907   7.934   14.231   5.011   7.611   5.491 
5.2. Forecasting the Level of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  BALANCE  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
4   2.639   0.588   3.317   2.575   10.817   76.019   0.379   3.666 
8   9.617   1.104   7.608   3.836   12.731   55.104   0.815   9.186 
12   8.636   6.484   8.169   6.121   13.994   42.128   0.651   13.816 
16   7.430   11.906   7.237   7.468   15.275   33.869   0.638   16.177 
20   7.312   14.564   6.506   7.898   15.812   29.753   0.585   17.571 
24   7.626   15.621   6.145   7.960   16.033   27.625   0.530   18.462 
5.3. Forecasting the Slope of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  BALANCE  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
4   13.529   17.972   0.821   42.745   0.152   10.975   13.064   0.742 
8   13.714   28.237   2.647   32.952   0.140   7.172   13.186   1.952 
12   13.159   29.348   3.171   31.757   0.154   6.771   13.117   2.522 
16   13.680   29.091   3.170   31.474   0.169   6.713   13.081   2.622 
20   13.785   29.030   3.192   31.408   0.171   6.684   13.116   2.616 
24   13.780   29.022   3.207   31.402   0.178   6.681   13.116   2.615 
5.4. Forecasting the Curvature of the Yield Curve 
Period  INF  DY4_ADJ  BALANCE  MMR  FSI  L  S  C 
 4   0.587   6.763   1.182   2.094   4.764   11.097   2.261   71.252 
 8   1.148   8.939   1.104   3.088   6.148   9.861   4.092   65.621 
 12   1.156   9.764   1.057   4.207   6.139   9.731   4.144   63.803 
 16   1.275   10.360   1.064   4.568   6.169   9.653   4.046   62.866 
 20   1.411   10.751   1.114   4.696   6.345   9.577   3.966   62.140 
 24   1.533   10.988   1.153   4.744   6.535   9.525   3.907   61.615 
 
Notes:  INF:  inflation;  DY4_ADJ:  annual  growth  rate  of  real  GDP  (adjusted  for  the  1991  structural  break); 
BALANCE: budget balance ratio (to GDP adjusted for the 1991 structural break); MMR: money market interest rate; 
FSI: financial stress indicator; L: level of the yield curve; S: slope of the yield curve; C: curvature of the yield curve. 
Each row shows the percentage of the variance of the error in forecasting the variable mentioned in the title of the 
table, at each forecasting horizon (in quarters) given in the first column. 
 
4.3.2.3. Granger causality   
In Table 6 we summarize the results of Granger causality tests between the fiscal 
variables and the yield curve latent factors in the case of Germany. Similarly to the U.S. 
case, we have run the tests for two lag lengths, the first corresponding to the order of the   43 
estimated  VARs  (2  lags)  and  the  second  corresponding  to  the  larger  lag  length 
considered for the U.S. case (12 lags). 
Panel  6.1  of  Table  6  reveals  that  lags  of  the  change  in  the  debt  ratio  do  not 
statistically decrease the variance of the error in regressions explaining each yield curve 
factor, either at the 2-quarter and at the 12-quarter horizons – a result similar to the one 
obtained for the U.S. That panel further shows that the yield curve slope is a leading 
indicator of the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio at both lag lengths – again, a result 
similar to the one found for the U.S. albeit in that case only for longer lengths.
2 
 
Table 6. Granger Causality between the fiscal variables and the Yield Curve latent 
factors, Germany 1981:I-2009:IV 
6.1. Debt-to-GDP ratio 
  Lags in regressions: 2  Lags in regressions: 12 
  DB4_ADJ  L  S  C  DB4_ADJ  L  S  C 
DB4  ---  0.745  0.287  0.547  ---  0.863  0.721  0.780 
L  0.498  ---  0.113  0.115  0.309  ---  0.306  0.431 
S  0.019**  0.040**  ---  0.706  0.054*  0.164  ---  0.989 
C  0.769  0.079*  0.719  ---  0.478  0.422  0.241  --- 
6.2. Budget balance 
  Lags in regressions: 2  Lags in regressions: 12 
  BALANCE  L  S  C  BALANCE  L  S  C 
BALANCE  ---  0.742  0.869  0.672  ---  0.301  0.844  0.861 
L  0.014**  ---  0.113  0.115  0.175  ---  0.306  0.431 
S  0.016**  0.040**  ---  0.706  0.049**  0.164  ---  0.989 
C  0.871  0.079*  0.719  ---  0.781  0.422  0.241  --- 
 
Notes: DB4_ADJ: annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio (with GDP adjusted for structural break in 1991); MMR: 
money market interest rate; BALANCE - fiscal balance in percentage of GDP (with GDP adjusted for structural 
break in 1991); L - level of the yield curve; S - slope of the yield curve; C - curvature of the yield curve. Each entry 
shows the p-value for the rejection of the null hypothesis that the variable in each row does not Granger-cause the 
variable in each column (Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.). 
 
The Granger causalities between the (adjusted) budget balance ratio and the yield 
curve latent factors are in this case, and as can be seen in panel 6.2, fairly similar to the 
ones involving the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In short, the budget balance is not a 
leading indicator of any of the yield curve latent factor, as it does not add valuable 
information for their forecast in addition to their own past values, either at a 2 or at a 12 
quarters lag length – a result that contrasts with the predictive power of the budget 
balance for the slope and curvature detected in the U.S. case. The slope consistently 
Granger causes the budget balance, irrespectively of the lag length considered. At short 
                                                 
2 For a more thorough comparison with the U.S. we have further ran the Granger causality tests for four 
lags. The results, summarized in Annex 2, are broadly similar to the ones obtained with two lags. 
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lag  lengths – either 2 or 4 quarters – the  level  of the  yield  curve  is also a  leading 
indicator of the budget balance – a result that is new, both in comparison to the results 
obtained for Germany with the debt indicator and in comparison to the budget balance 
results for the U.S.   
 
4.3.3. Sub-sample analysis 
It could be argued that the VAR analyses carried out in the previous sub-sections 
may  suffer  from  econometric  instability  because  of  changes  in  the  structure  of  the 
economies as well as, most notably, changes in the fiscal and monetary regimes. While 
such regimes changes are harder to pin down in the U.S. case, for Germany there is an 
obvious policy regime change around 1999, with the introduction of the euro. Hence, 
we  now  perform  a  VAR  analysis  for  Germany  splitting  the  sample  into  two  sub-
samples, 1981:I-1998:IV and 1999:I-2009:IV, for which we estimate, as above, VAR(2) 
models.
3  However,  we  consider  this  analysis  merely  exploratory,  given  the  lack  of 
degrees of  freedom  notably  in the post-1999 sub-sample, and report in the text and 
present in Annex 2 only a summary of the results (further details are available from the 
authors upon request). 
As figures A2.1 through A2.4 in Annex 2 show, the impulse response functions to 
fiscal shocks are indeed different: fiscal shocks have had significant impacts over the 
yield curve shape before 1999 but not after 1999. The impacts before 1999 are identical 
for shocks to the change in the debt ratio and shocks in the budget balance ratio and are 
similar – albeit more clear – to those obtained for the debt ratio in the whole sample. In 
short, during the 3 quarters after the shock, a fiscal expansion leads to no change in the 
level and slope of the yield curve but to a decrease in its curvature, i.e. a decrease in its 
degree of concavity. Since the slope and the level do not change, the transitory fall in 
concavity means that during such period, the medium-term yields fall and both the short 
and the long-term yields increase.  
Therefore, we obtain the interesting result that with the change in the monetary and 
fiscal regime, with the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact two years earlier, 
and along with the deepening of the market for debt denominated in euros and of overall 
economic and financial integration in Europe, fiscal shocks turned out somehow to be 
                                                 
3 Another potential regime change in the case of Germany would be the reunification in 1991, but this 
cannot really be tested since our available data sample only starts in 1981.   45 




In this paper we have studied the relation between fiscal behaviour and the shape 
of the yield curve in the U.S. and in Germany for the period 1981:I-2009:IV. Following 
a well-established tradition in the finance literature, we have described the shape of the 
yield curve with estimates of time-varying latent factors that represent its level, slope 
and curvature. We then estimated country-specific VAR models similar to those of an 
also well-established macro-finance literature, developed with the addition of a fiscal 
variable – the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio and, alternatively, the budget balance as 
percent  of  GDP  –  and  a  control  for  financial  stress  conditions.  The  analysis  of  the 
dynamics implied by the estimated VARs uncovered a set of basic stylized facts on the 
relation  between  fiscal  behaviour  and  the  shape  of  the  yield  curve  in  the  U.S.  and 
Germany, which add to the literature that has focused essentially on the effect of fiscal 
policy on a sub-set of sovereign yields, especially long-term yields.  
The  results  of  our  paper  indicate  that,  during  the  last  three  decades,  fiscal 
behaviour has had a different impact on the yield curve in the U.S. and in Germany. 
Fiscal developments have generated significant responses of the yield curve that spread 
out through the subsequent three years in the U.S., while they generated virtually no 
significant reactions of the shape of the yield curve in Germany. Our results are thus 
consistent with the literature that, with distinct approaches, has detected stronger effects 
of fiscal variables on yields in the case of the U.S. compared to Europe (e.g. Codogno, 
Favero and Missale, 2003; Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht, 2006; Faini, 2006; 
Paesani, Strauch and Kremer, 2006; Afonso and Strauch, 2007; Ardagna, 2009). 
In the U.S., fiscal shocks have led to an immediate response of the short-end of the 
yield curve that is apparently associated with the reaction of monetary policy to the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal developments. Such reaction lasts a year and a half (for 
debt ratio shocks) and two years (for budget balance shocks). Fiscal shocks further led 
to  an  immediate  response  of  the  long-end  segment  of  the  yield  curve  –  with  fiscal 
expansions leading to an increase in long-term sovereign yields – that lasts three years. 
At the height of the effects, our estimates imply an elasticity of long-term yields to a 
debt ratio shock of about 80 percent (10
th-11
th quarters after the shock) and an elasticity 
to  a  budget  balance  shock  of  about  48  percent  (12  quarters  after  the  shock).  The   46 
estimated duration of the impact of fiscal shocks on long-term yields is consistent with 
the findings in Dai and Phillipon (2006) and our estimate for the elasticity of long-term 
yields to the budget balance is not substantially different from their estimate. Yet, our 
results differ from those in papers that found a smaller elasticity of long yields to the 
debt ratio than to the budget balance (e.g. Laubach, 2009; Engen and Hubbard, 2004; 
Kinoshita, 2006; Chalk and Tanzi, 2002), although such studies do not consider the full 
yield curve latent factors as we do. 
We have complemented the evidence with forecast errors variance decompositions 
and Granger causality tests. Shocks to the change in the debt ratio account for most of 
the variance of the errors in forecasting the level of the yield curve at horizons above 1 
year and explain 40 percent of such variance at a 12 quarter horizon. Such shocks also 
account  for  substantial,  albeit  smaller,  fractions  of  the  variance  of  the  error  in 
forecasting the slope and the curvature of the yield curve. Shocks to the budget balance 
ratio are also relevant in accounting for the variance of the errors of the yield curve 
factors. Highlighting the importance of studying fiscal shocks we could not reject the 
hypotheses that the change in the debt ratio Granger-causes the shape of the yield curve. 
As regards the budget balance, Granger causality has only been found for the slope and 
the curvature of the yield curve. 
The results for Germany differ from those obtained for the U.S. On the one hand, 
fiscal shocks entail no comparable reactions of the yield curve factors. On the other 
hand, they generate no significant response of the monetary policy interest rate. The 
results  also  differ  across  the  two  alternative  fiscal  variables.  Shocks  to  the  budget 
balance ratio create no response from any component of the yield curve shape, while a 
surprise increase in the change of the debt ratio causes a decline in the concavity of the 
yield curve that implies an increase in both the short-end and the long-end of the yield 
curve; yet, such reaction is very quick and transitory, as it is statistically significant only 
during the 2
nd and 3
rd quarters after the shock. Our exploratory analysis of the effects of 
fiscal shocks on the yield curve before and after 1999, has suggested that the results 
found for shocks to the change in the debt ratio seem more due to the period before 
1999, when they are recorded for both fiscal measures. Indeed, in the period 1981-1998, 
fiscal shocks have led to a significant impact on the curvature of the German yield curve 
in  the  three  quarters  after  the  shock,  with  expansionary  fiscal  shocks  leading  to 
transitory increases in the yields of the shortest and of the longest maturities.     47 
The impulse response analysis has been complemented with forecast errors variance 
decompositions. In Germany, fiscal shocks have been overall unimportant in accounting 
for  the  variance  of  the  forecast  errors  of  the  yield  curve  latent  factors,  with  two 
exceptions. First, the debt ratio shocks explain a not negligible part of the errors in 
forecasting the curvature – consistently with the impulse responses; second, the budget 
balance shocks are somewhat relevant in accounting for errors in forecasting the level of 
the yield curve. In the case of Germany, the results from Granger causality tests agree 
with the  impulse responses and  forecast errors variance decompositions, as  it is  not 
possible to reject the hypothesis that either the debt ratio or the budget balance Granger-
cause any of the yield curve factors.   
Finally, one needs to be aware that the sovereign debt of the two countries under 
analysis are usually seen as a safe haven, both in times of fiscal stress in other countries, 
and when economic conditions deteriorate globally. 
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Appendix – Data sources 
US 
Zero-coupon yields (1961:6-2009:12) 
Maturities of 12, 24, 36, 48, 60, 72, 84, 96, 108 and 120 months: companion data to 
Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007), updated and available at (accessed April 2010) 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm 
Maturities of 3, 6, 9, 15, 18, 21 and 30 months: computed by the authors with the 
Nelson-Siegel-Svensson  formula  and  the  coefficients  made  available  at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm 
GDP, GDP deflator. Source:  International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Federal funds rate, 11160B..ZF... Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Government debt, Federal debt held by the public, FYGFDPUN, Millions of Dollars. 
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service,  
Government  budgetary  position:  Federal  Government  Current  Receipts  and 
Expenditures, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Germany 
Zero-coupon yields (1972:9-2010:03) 
Maturities of 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 48, 60, 72, 84, 96, 108  and  120  months: 
Bundesbank (data made available on April 2010). 
Maturities of 3, 9, 15, 21 months: computed by the authors with the Nelson-Siegel-
Svensson formula and the coefficients made available by the Bundesbank. 
GDP, GDP deflator. Source: Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Monetary  policy  rate:  Lombard  rate,  Germany,  1980:1-1998:4.  Marginal  lending 
facility, ECB, 1999:1-2009:4. 
Government  debt,  Central,  state  and  local  government  debt;  Total  debt,  excluding 
hospitals  (BQ1710,  BQ1720).  Source:  Statistische  Angaben:  Umrechnungsart: 
Endstand, Euro, Millions, Bundesbank. 
Government  spending,  General  government  budgetary  position;  Expenditure,  total   
(BQ2190). Euro, Millions, Bundesbank. 
Government  revenue,  General  government  budgetary  position;  Revenue,  total 
(BQ2180). Euro, Millions, Bundesbank. 
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Financial stress index (FSI) suggested by Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag and Tytell 
(2009), available at (accessed May 2010) 
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/update/wp09133.zip   
The FSI computes the overall  financial conditions  faced  by each  individual country 
considering seven financial variables (previously demeaned and standardized): (i) the 
banking-sector beta, (ii) the TED spread – the 3-month LIBOR or commercial paper 
rate  minus  the  government  short-term  rate  –,  (iii)  the  inverted  term  spread  –  the 
government short-term rate  minus government  long-term rate –, (iv) the corporate 
debt spreads – corporate bond yield minus long-term government bond yield –, (v) the 
stock market returns – the month-over-month change in the stock index multiplied by 
minus one –, (vi) the stock market volatility – measured as the 6-month (backward 
looking)  moving  average  of  the  squared  month-on-month  returns  –  and  (vii)  the 
foreign exchange market volatility –the 6-month (backward looking) moving average 
of the squared month-on-month growth rate of the exchange rate (for details see the 
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Annex 1 – Hyper-parameters 
Table  A1.1  reports  the  estimates  and  corresponding  significance  levels  of  the 
hyper-parameters included in the transition matrix, for the U.S (see related analysis in 
the text).  
 
Table A1.1. Transition matrices A and , U.S. 1961:6-2010:2 
  1 t L    1 t S    1 t C     
t L   0.9875 ***  -0.0001  0.0133 ***  7.704 *** 
t S   -0.0006 ***  0.9695 ***  0.0231  -2.143 ** 
t C   0.0197  -0.0006  0.9333 ***  -0.625 * 
Notes: Each row shows the hyper-parameters of the transition equation for the respective latent 
factor. Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent. 
 
Table A1.2 reports estimates and significance levels of the hyper-parameters in the 
variance-covariance matrix of the innovations to the transition system, for the U.S (see 
related analysis in the text).  
 
Table A1.2. Variance-covariance matrix Q, U.S. 1961:6-2010:2 
 
t L   t S   t C  
t L   0.0875 ***  3.705E-06  9.832E-06 *** 
t S     0.2522 ***  2.467E-08 
t C       0.5594 *** 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent. 
 
Table A.1.3 provides information on the innovations to the measurement equations 
– estimates and significance levels of their variance – as well as on the one-step-ahead 
prediction  errors  of  the  observable  vector  –  mean  and  standard  deviation.  The 
innovations with higher variance are those to the equations of the yields of 3, 6, 9 and 
12 months of maturity. Consistently, the one-step-ahead measurement errors of these 
maturities display the larger mean values and higher standard deviations. In comparison 
with the literature (Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba, 2006, Table 2) our measurement 
errors  have  higher  mean  values  at  those  maturities  but  lower  mean  values  at  the 
remaining maturities, while overall the standard deviations of our errors are larger. 
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Table A1.3. Variance matrix of measurement innovations (H) and 











3  0.22341 ***  -4.87155  64.32609 
6  0.05425 ***  -5.08712  50.16713 
9  0.01703 ***  -3.46297  45.70892 
12  0.00445 ***  -1.94114  43.25009 
15  0.00067 ***  -0.73576  41.66852 
18  0.00000 ***  0.15319  40.48555 
21  0.00026 ***  0.76714  39.49113 
24  0.00064 ***  1.15708  38.59584 
30  0.00098 ***  1.45169  36.97584 
36  0.00079 ***  1.35044  35.52784 
48  0.00018 ***  0.72135  33.11475 
60  0.00000  0.13830  31.27960 
72  0.00004 ***  -0.14723  29.89333 
84  0.00004 ***  -0.12716  28.83799 
96  0.00000 *  0.12463  28.03978 
108  0.00012 ***  0.51733  27.46401 
120  0.00067 ***  0.96980  27.10206 
Notes: The first column is the main diagonal of matrix H, expressed in percentage points. The 
second and third columns are the first two empirical moments of the one-step-ahead forecast errors, 
expressed in basis points. Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent. 
 
Table  A1.4  reports  the  estimates  and  corresponding  significance  levels  of  the 
hyper-parameters included in the transition matrix, for Germany. The estimated means 
for the latent factors are similar to those obtained for the US, although the mean level of 
the yield curve is somewhat smaller and the average yield curve has been somehow 
steeper. As normal,   t L  is more persistent than  t S , which in turn is more persistent than 
t C .  
Table A1.4. Transition matrices A and , Germany 1972:9-2010:3 
  1 t L    1 t S    1 t C     
t L   0.9732 ***  -0.00009  0.0275***  6.0235 *** 
t S   -0.01225  0.9687 ***  0.0307***  -2.9147 ** 
t C   0.0892***  0.0234*  0.8572 ***  -1.6899 
Notes: Each row shows the hyper-parameters of the transition equation for the respective latent 
factor. Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent. 
 
Table A1.5 reports estimates and significance levels of the hyper-parameters in the 
variance-covariance matrix of the innovations to the transition system, for Germany. 
While the variance of the innovations to  t L  and  t C  are similar to those estimated for the 
U.S. the variance of the innovations to the slope is markedly higher.  
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Table A1.5. Variance-covariance matrix Q, Germany 1972:9-2010:3 
 
t L   t S   t C  
t L   0.1167***  5.872E-07**  6.396E-07*** 
t S     0.2453***  1.442E-06* 
t C       1.1908 *** 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent. 
 
Table A.1.6 provides, for Germany, the same information presented in table A1.3 
for the U.S. The variability and the mean values of the one-step-ahead prediction errors 
for maturities of 3 and 6 moths are quite larger than those obtained for the U.S., as are 
the variance of the innovations to the measurement equations at those maturities. As 
maturities increase, the estimates and results are increasingly in line with those for the 
U.S. 
 
Table A1.6. Variance matrix of measurement innovations (H) and mean/standard 











3  2.28424***  34.18545  153.18946 
6  0.43499***  14.76647  75.29714 
9  0.10119***  6.98754  48.86525 
12  0.02243***  3.336367  39.91686 
15  0.00310***  1.53812  37.10091 
18  3.25971E-09**  0.65775  36.24207 
21  0.00107***  0.25063  35.89211 
24  0.00258***  0.08989  35.59082 
30  0.00373***  0.08881  34.75297 
36  0.00289***  0.22113  33.68060 
48  0.00060***  0.45867  31.59276 
60  2.525E-11***  0.56281  30.04124 
72  0.00014***  0.57621  28.96569 
84  0.00012***  0.54464  28.20496 
96  1.46984E-10***  0.50245  27.71625 
108  0.00036***  0.44897  27.52461 
120  0.00190***  0.39675  27.68607 
Notes: The first column is the main diagonal of matrix H, expressed in percentage points. The 
second and third columns are the first two empirical moments of the one-step-ahead forecast errors, 
expressed in basis points. Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent. 
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Annex 2 – Additional VAR analysis for Germany  
 
Table A2.1 shows that, for Germany, Granger causality tests run for a 4-quarter 
regression horizon, give essentially the same results as those obtained at the 2 and 12-
quarter horizons and discussed in the text.  
 
Table A2.1. Granger Causality between the fiscal variables and the Yield Curve 
latent factors at a 4-quarter horizon, Germany 1981:I-2009:IV 
  DB4_ADJ  L  S  C      BALANCE  L  S  C 
DB4_ADJ  -  0.847  0.447  0.716    BALANCE  -  0.328  0.731  0.873 
L  0.468  -  0.599  0.107    L  0.009***  -  0.599  0.107 
S  0.049**  0.099*  -  0.580    S  0.011**  0.099*  -  0.580 
C  0.381  0.198  0.415  -    C  0.435  0.198  0.415  - 
 
Notes: DB4_ADJ: annual change of the debt-to-GDP ratio (with GDP adjusted for structural break in 1991); MMR: 
money market interest rate; BALANCE - fiscal balance in percentage of GDP (with GDP adjusted for structural 
break in 1991); L - level of the yield curve; S - slope of the yield curve; C - curvature of the yield curve. Each entry 
shows the p-value for the rejection of the null hypothesis that the variable in each row does not Granger-cause the 
variable in each column (Significance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.). 
 
Figures A2.1 through A2.4 show that, for Germany, the impulse response functions 
to fiscal shocks are different before and after the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
introduction of the euro. For instance, and consistently for shocks to the change in the 
debt ratio and shocks in the budget balance ratio, fiscal shocks have significant impacts 
over  the  yield  curve  shape  before  1999  but  not  after  1999.  Such  impacts  can  be 
summarised as follows. During the three quarters after the shock, a fiscal expansion 
leads to no change in the level and slope of the yield curve but to a decrease in its 
curvature, i.e. a decrease in its degree of concavity. Since the slope and level do not 
change, the transitory fall in concavity means that, during such period, the medium-term 
yields fall and both the short and the long-term yields increase.     58 
Figure A2.1. Impulse Response Functions to shock in annual change of the 
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Figure A2.2. Impulse Response Functions to shock in annual change of the 
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